Coverage Information in Insurance Law by Schwarcz, Daniel
University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Minnesota Law Review
2017
Coverage Information in Insurance Law
Daniel Schwarcz
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law
Review collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Schwarcz, Daniel, "Coverage Information in Insurance Law" (2017). Minnesota Law Review. 160.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr/160
  
 
1457 
Article 
Coverage Information in Insurance Law 
Daniel Schwarcz† 
Introduction  ........................................................................... 1458 
I. Three Types of Coverage Information: Purchaser 
information, Policy information, and Judicial 
Information  .................................................................. 1466 
A.  Insurance Law and Purchaser Information  ........ 1467 
B.  Insurance Law and Policy Information  ............... 1471 
C.  Insurance Law and Judicial Information  ............ 1476 
II. Rationales for Laws and Regulations that Promote 
the Three Types of Coverage Information  .................. 1480 
A.  Rationales for Promoting Purchaser Information 
in Insurance Markets  ........................................... 1481 
1.  Promoting More Efficient Insurance Policies .. 1481 
2.  Promoting Matching Between Policyholders 
and Policies, and Limiting Adverse Selection . 1484 
3.  Impacting Policyholder Behavior and 
Reducing Moral Hazard  .................................. 1486 
B.  Rationales for Promoting Policy Information in 
Insurance Markets  ................................................ 1490 
1.  Promoting More Efficient Insurance Policies .. 1491 
2.  Promoting More Effective Regulatory Form 
Review  .............................................................. 1492 
3.  Preventing Unfair Claims Handling  .............. 1494 
4.  Conserving Judicial Resources  ....................... 1498 
C.  Rationales for Promoting Judicial Information in 
Insurance Markets  ................................................ 1499 
 
†  Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School. For comments 
on earlier drafts, I thank Kenneth Abraham, Ronen Avraham, Tom Baker, 
Omri Ben-Shahar, Michelle Boardman, Ezra Friedman, Robert Jerry, Erik 
Knutsen, Kyle Logue, Peter Molk, Peter Siegelman, Shauhin Talesh, as well 
as participants in workshops at Northwestern Law School and Dalian Mari-
time University. Alysha Bohanon and Paige Haughton provided excellent re-
search assistance. Copyright © 2017 by Daniel Schwarcz. 
  
1458 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [101:1457 
 
1.  Facilitating Insurers’ Control of Coverage 
and Limiting Correlated Risks to Insurers  .... 1499 
2.  Reducing the Cost and Risk of Resolving 
Claims Disputes  ............................................... 1502 
III. Conflicts Between Purchaser Information and Policy 
Information  .................................................................. 1504 
A.  The Use of Extrinsic Evidence To Disambiguate 
Policy Language  .................................................... 1505 
B.  Policyholders’ Reasonable Expectations of 
Coverage  ................................................................ 1510 
C.  Insurance Disclosures, Plain Language, and 
Policy Simplification  ............................................. 1514 
IV. Conflicts Between Policy Information and Judicial 
Information  .................................................................. 1516 
A.  Contra Proferentem Promotes Policy 
Information While More Specific Default Rules 
Promote Judicial Information  .............................. 1517 
B.  The Sophisticated Policyholder Exception to 
Contra Proferentem  .............................................. 1521 
Conclusion  .............................................................................. 1527 
  INTRODUCTION   
A recent Liberty Mutual advertisement explains: “Your car 
insurance policy is twenty-two pages long. Did you read every 
word? Nope. Only lawyers do that. So when you got rear-ended 
and you needed a tow, your insurance company told you to look 
at page five on your policy. Did it say, ‘great news, you’re cov-
ered’ on page five? No. It said, ‘blah blah, blah blah blah, blah 
blah.’”1 The advertisement’s effectiveness lies in its recognition 
of the obvious: ordinary people do not read their insurance poli-
cies when they purchase coverage.2 And when an insurer denies 
 
 1. See Liberty Mutual, Insurance TV Commercial – Coverage Compass 
:30, YOUTUBE (Oct. 24, 2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v= 
Ci40Z0osr0E. 
 2. See Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Does Contract Disclosure Matter?, 168 
J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 94, 96–97 (2012) (finding that the 
vast majority of consumers do not read their contracts even when they have 
access to the contract). This is particularly likely to be true in insurance, as 
policyholders generally do not receive their insurance policy until after they 
have purchased or renewed their coverage. See KENNETH S. ABRAHAM & 
DANIEL SCHWARCZ, INSURANCE LAW AND REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 
38 (6th ed. 2015). 
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a claim on the basis of specific policy terms, that language is of-
ten indecipherable.3 
Despite these facts, a central goal of insurance law and 
regulation is to clarify insurers’ coverage obligations to policy-
holders.4 Thus, the “first rule” of insurance law, contra 
proferentem, directs courts to interpret ambiguities in insur-
ance policies against the drafter in the hope that doing so will 
induce insurers to draft their insurance policies more clearly.5 
Similarly, insurance law’s mercurial reasonable expectations 
doctrine is, in most of its various incarnations, intended at 
least in part to help ensure that policyholders have accurate in-
formation about the essential features of their coverage.6 State 
insurance statutes and regulations also aim to clarify coverage 
information by, for instance, prohibiting deceptive advertising 
and marketing,7 and requiring insurance policies to meet quan-
titative measures of word and sentence complexity.8 
 
 3. See, e.g., Michelle Boardman, Insuring Understanding: The Tested 
Language Defense, 95 IOWA L. REV. 1075, 1077 (2010); Christopher C. French, 
The Illusion of Insurance Contracts, 89 TEMP. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017); Su-
san Randall, Freedom of Contract in Insurance, 14 CONN. INS. L.J. 107, 125 
(2007). 
 4. Of course, insurance law is also concerned about the accurate trans-
mission of various other types of information. The most obvious example in-
volves information about policyholders’ risk levels, which is promoted by state 
laws governing insurers’ right to rescind coverage on the basis of policyholder 
misrepresentations. See ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 2, at 15–20. 
 5. See Kenneth S. Abraham, A Theory of Insurance Policy Interpretation, 
95 MICH. L. REV. 531, 531 (1996); Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in 
Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 
120–21 n.147 (1989); Michelle Boardman, Penalty Default Rules in Insurance 
Law, 40 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 305, 305 (2013). 
 6. See Roger C. Henderson, The Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations in 
Insurance Law After Two Decades, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 823, 825 (1990); Robert E. 
Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance with Policy Provisions, 83 HARV. L. 
REV. 961, 966–67 (1970); see also Kenneth S. Abraham, Four Conceptions of 
Insurance, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 653, 660 (2013) (noting the structural barriers 
that otherwise diminish policyholders’ abilities to give informed assent); Dan-
iel Schwarcz, A Products Liability Theory of the Judicial Regulation of Insur-
ance Policies, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1389, 1394–95 (2007) (observing the 
widespread notion that the reasonable expectations doctrine promotes greater 
transparency from insurers). To be sure, the reasonable expectations doctrine 
can also serve non-informational goals, such as leveling the playing field be-
tween insurers and policyholders. 
 7. Daniel Schwarcz, Transparently Opaque: Understanding the Lack of 
Transparency in Insurance Consumer Protection, 61 UCLA L. REV. 394, 414–
15 (2014). 
 8. See NONPERSONAL LINES PROP. AND CAS. INS. POLICY SIMPLIFICATION 
MODEL REGULATION (NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS 1997), http://www.naic.org/ 
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Why is insurance law and regulation so fixated on promot-
ing coverage information despite the fact that so little of this 
information seems to filter down to ordinary consumers? This 
question motivates what follows. Despite the centrality of cov-
erage information to insurance law and regulation, the extant 
literature examines this issue predominantly through the lens 
of specific doctrines, such as the ambiguity rule or the reasona-
ble expectations doctrine. By contrast, this Article explores how 
insurance law and regulation as a whole seek to promote cover-
age information, and what broader efficiency goals this infor-
mation can and does serve. In taking up this challenge, this Ar-
ticle strives not only to illuminate the broader structure of 
insurance law and regulation, but also to provide new insights 
on various thorny doctrinal and regulatory issues. 
Towards these ends, this Article distinguishes among three 
different types of coverage information that insurance law and 
regulation affirmatively seek to promote: (1) “purchaser infor-
mation”; (2) “policy information”; and (3) “judicial information.” 
The first type of coverage information, purchaser information, 
consists of coverage information that is communicated to poli-
cyholders throughout the sale and purchase process. In the con-
text of a typical homeowners insurance policy, for instance, 
purchaser information might include the fact that the policy 
protects the designated home and most personal possessions 
against fire and other perils, excludes damage stemming from 
floods and earthquakes, includes a five hundred dollar deducti-
ble, and covers some potential lawsuits against the homeowner. 
Purchaser information might be shaped by policyholders’ con-
versations with insurance agents or friends or exposure to in-
surers’ marketing materials and advertisements. By contrast, 
purchaser information does not generally include information 
in the insurance policy itself because most policyholders do not 
read their policies at any point prior to finalizing their pur-
chase. 
Purchaser information can promote product quality, facili-
tate informed consumer selection of products, and encourage 
effective product use. But these latter two benefits are particu-
larly notable in the insurance setting because they allow insur-
ers to use contract design to efficiently counteract the twin in-
surance evils of moral hazard and adverse selection.9 When 
 
store/free/MDL-732.pdf. 
 9. See Daniel Schwarcz, Reevaluating Standardized Insurance Policies, 
78 U. CHI. L. REV. 1263, 1283 (2011). 
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policyholders lack purchaser information, exclusions aimed at 
counteracting moral hazard simply shift these costs onto poli-
cyholders, rather than actually reducing or eliminating the 
costs of moral hazard.10 To take a simple example, deductibles 
obviously cannot influence policyholder behavior and thus limit 
moral hazard if policyholders are unaware that their coverage 
includes a deductible or do not know what a deductible means 
in the first place. Insurers’ efforts to combat adverse selection 
through policy exclusions also rely in part on purchaser infor-
mation: by excluding difficult to detect and unusual risks, in-
surance policies can induce policyholders to reveal their high-
risk status to insurers and secure appropriately priced addi-
tional coverage. When policyholders lack purchaser infor-
mation, the result of these exclusions is that insurers avoid ad-
verse selection only by denying high-risk purchasers insurance 
protection for which they would have been willing to pay. 
Second, insurance law and regulation aim to improve “poli-
cy information,” which is information in the insurance policy 
itself—divorced from any relevant extrinsic evidence or judicial 
case law—about the scope of coverage that is available for spe-
cific types of losses. As the Liberty Mutual advertisement re-
minds us, remarkably few ordinary consumers read and under-
stand their policies at any point during the purchase and sale 
process, meaning that policy information does not directly pro-
mote purchaser information in many insurance markets.11 De-
spite this fact, policy information can serve a number of im-
portant consumer protection goals by providing coverage 
information to non-contracting parties, including regulators, 
lawyers, and market intermediaries. For instance, policy in-
formation can facilitate state regulators’ review and approval of 
insurance policy forms, which most states mandate for consum-
er-oriented insurance coverage.12 This is because more detailed 
and specific insurance policies allow insurance regulators to 
better interrogate whether coverage will be limited in ways 
that consumers do not expect or that insurers cannot convinc-
ingly justify. 
 
 10. To be sure, insurers have mechanisms at their disposal other than 
contract design to attempt to address these phenomena, such as underwriting 
and experience rating. See KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK: INSUR-
ANCE, LEGAL THEORY, AND PUBLIC POLICY 14–16 (1986). 
 11. See Abraham, supra note 6 (“For virtually all individuals, insurance 
policies are complex documents with terms they neither read nor under-
stand.”). 
 12. See infra Part II.B.2. 
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Specific and clear policy information also plays an im-
portant and generally unappreciated role in limiting the risk 
that insurers will exploit policyholder ignorance to delay or de-
ny valid insurance claims.13 It does so by allowing policyhold-
ers—with the help of family, insurance agents, lawyers, or reg-
ulators—to independently assess the strength of an insurer’s 
coverage denial at the time of that determination. By contrast, 
policyholders are effectively shut out of this process if the policy 
language invoked to justify an insurer’s claims determination 
reads to the consumer and those from whom she seeks assis-
tance as “blah, blah, blah,” as in the Liberty Mutual commer-
cial. This power of specific and clear policy information to disci-
pline insurers’ claims handling is importantly enhanced by two 
common rules of insurance law: (1) state regulations requiring 
insurers to explain coverage denials or reservations by refer-
ence to the relevant policy language;14 and (2) the availability of 
extra-contractual damages for policyholders whose coverage is 
delayed or denied by an insurer that does not have a reasonable 
basis for its actions.15 
The third type of coverage information that insurance law 
promotes is “judicial information,” which consists of infor-
mation regarding insurers’ coverage obligations that is ascer-
tainable only after researching judicial opinions resolving cov-
erage disputes. Such judicial information includes both default 
rules that fill in gaps in insurance policies, as well as judicially 
crafted tests for applying policy provisions. Examples include 
the “efficient proximate cause rule” for defining the cause of an 
insured loss,16 the “eight corners rule” for determining whether 
 
 13. JAY M. FEINMAN, DELAY, DENY, DEFEND: WHY INSURANCE COMPA-
NIES DON’T PAY CLAIMS AND WHAT YOU CAN DO ABOUT IT 202 (2010). 
 14. See infra note 154. 
 15. See Jay M. Feinman, The Law of Insurance Claim Practices: Beyond 
Bad Faith, 47 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 693, 738–39 (2012). In some of her 
work, Michelle Boardman has acknowledged the potential for unambiguous 
contract language to limit the risk of unfair claims practices. See Boardman, 
supra note 3, at 1106. 
 16. Coverage issues may arise in property insurance when more than one 
peril caused or contributed to the loss, and one of these perils is covered under 
the policy while the other is excluded. The default “efficient proximate cause” 
rule dictates that a loss is covered under a policy if the covered peril was the 
predominant cause of the loss. Erik S. Knutsen, Confusion About Causation in 
Insurance: Solutions for Catastrophic Losses, 61 ALA. L. REV. 957, 971 (2010); 
Joseph Lavitt, The Doctrine of Efficient Proximate Cause, The Katrina Disas-
ter, Prosser’s Folly, and the Third Restatement of Torts: Cracking the Conun-
drum, 54 LOY. L. REV. 1, 11 (2008). 
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a liability insurer has a duty to defend a policyholder,17 and the 
“manifestation test” for assessing when coverage is triggered 
under an occurrence-based liability policy.18 While judicial in-
formation is not unique to insurance law, it is unusually com-
mon in this domain because of the consistency of policy lan-
guage across different insurers and policy types.19 Moreover, 
unlike ordinary gap-fillers in contract law, which tend to rely 
on broad standards such as “commercial reasonableness,”20 ju-
dicial information in insurance law is often surprisingly specific 
and detailed.21 
Of course, the intended audience for judicial information 
does not include policyholders. Instead, judicial information is 
directed toward insurers, market intermediaries, lawyers, and 
judges. This information allows insurers to more accurately 
price their policies notwithstanding uncertainty in future loss 
experience, to avoid non-diversifiable legal risk, and to adjust 
their contractual obligations so that untenable interpretations 
of policy language have a limited long-term effect on results.22 
Meanwhile, it enables lawyers to advise insurers and policy-
holders regarding coverage issues, and it allows judges to re-
solve coverage cases more quickly and consistently. 
Distinguishing among purchaser information, policy infor-
mation, and judicial information and clearly identifying the po-
tential market benefits of each form of coverage information 
 
 17. Under the “eight corners rule,” a liability insurer’s duty to defend a 
claim is determined by reviewing the four corners of the plaintiff ’s complaint 
plus the four corners of the policy, without reference to extrinsic matters. See 
RESTATEMENT OF LIAB. INS. § 13 (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 1, 2016). 
 18. The “manifestation test” requires an injury to occur, or manifest, dur-
ing the policy period to trigger coverage under an occurrence-based liability 
policy. See id. § 33. 
 19. Even with the most careful drafting (or, in the case of insurance poli-
cies, the use of standardized forms), no contract can fully explain every risk or 
circumstance that may occur pursuant to an agreement. Default rules tell 
courts how to fill in gaps or holes created by missing, under-defined, or unclear 
terms in a contract. Unlike mandatory rules, parties may contract around the-
se rules. See Tom Baker & Kyle D. Logue, Mandatory Rules and Default Rules 
in Insurance Contracts, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF IN-
SURANCE LAW 377, 379–83 (Daniel Schwarcz & Peter Siegelman eds., 2015). 
 20. For various examples, see U.C.C. art. 2 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW 
COMM’N 2002). 
 21. See Abraham, supra note 6, at 665–66; see also Louis Kaplow, Rules 
Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 610 (1992) (re-
marking on the differing difficulty of learning about laws crafted by the legis-
lature compared to precedents established by courts). 
 22. See infra Part II.C. 
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not only helps illuminate the underlying structure of insurance 
law; it also sheds new light on various long-standing disputes 
in the field, which often require prioritization and trade-offs 
among the three different types of coverage information. In-
deed, in some cases promoting one form of coverage information 
directly and proportionally undermines another form of cover-
age information. Appreciating the potential benefits of each 
type of information can help judges and regulators optimize 
this tradeoff. 
Consider one doctrinal debate involving a conflict between 
purchaser information and policy information: whether insur-
ers should be allowed to admit extrinsic evidence to clarify am-
biguous policy language. Courts generally take into account ex-
trinsic evidence of the parties’ intent when interpreting 
ambiguous contracts. But adopting this approach in the insur-
ance setting may reduce policy information by blunting insur-
ers’ incentives to draft their policies clearly; insurers are less 
likely to incur the costs of revising ambiguous policy language 
if they can introduce extrinsic evidence in coverage disputes to 
clarify their intended meaning. 
This Article suggests that there are indeed good reasons 
for courts to resist the ordinary practice of admitting extrinsic 
evidence to clarify insurance policy language, at least in dis-
putes involving consumer policyholders. Extrinsic evidence may 
well suggest that an aggrieved policyholder knew, or should 
have known, at the time of purchase that her policy would not 
cover the loss at issue, even if the policy language on point is 
ambiguous. But this fact alone should not be dispositive, be-
cause policy information can benefit insurance markets for rea-
sons having nothing to do with purchaser information. For in-
stance, policy information can facilitate regulators’ review of 
policies. By contrast, clarifications conveyed to policyholders 
orally at the time of purchase cannot promote this regulatory 
process for the simple reason that regulators conducting form 
review do not observe this purchaser information. Similarly, 
specific and clear policy information can facilitate policyholders’ 
capacity to independently assess the legitimacy of coverage de-
lays or denials. By contrast, oral statements conveyed to poli-
cyholders at the time of purchase may not serve this function 
because they are not necessarily easily recalled by policyhold-
ers at the time that a claim is denied and are not reliably ascer-
tainable by lawyers and other potential coverage advisors. The-
se benefits of policy information are amplified in consumer 
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insurance settings, where form review is particularly important 
and the risk of unfair claims denials is heightened. All this 
suggests that courts should be wary of allowing insurers to 
clarify the meaning of ambiguous policy language with extrin-
sic evidence in personal lines disputes. 
This Article’s framework can also illuminate clashes be-
tween policy information and judicial information. For in-
stance, a perennial question in insurance law is whether there 
should be a “sophisticated policyholder” exception to the ambi-
guity rule.23 This Article provides new arguments in favor of 
such an exception by suggesting that the ambiguity rule results 
in less robust judicial information than more specific default 
rules.24 Robust judicial information is key for insurance mar-
kets populated by sophisticated policyholders, as it helps coun-
teract the risk that these policyholders will exploit the same 
unintended or unanticipated ambiguity in policy language. The 
risk of such correlated claim contestation is heightened when 
policyholders are sophisticated and capable of making long-
term investments in coverage litigation. Although specific de-
fault rules tend to undermine policy information, this result is 
tolerable in insurance markets populated by sophisticated poli-
cyholders. Many of the central benefits of policy information—
including its role in promoting more effective regulatory form 
review and its ability to empower policyholders to independent-
ly scrutinize claim delays or denials—are simply less applicable 
or important in insurance markets populated principally by so-
phisticated policyholders. 
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I disentangles the 
three different types of coverage information: purchaser infor-
mation, policy information, and judicial information. It shows 
how insurance law and regulation foster each type of coverage 
information. Part II then explores the ways in which each of 
the three forms of coverage information can potentially promote 
the efficient operation of insurance markets. Part III applies 
these concepts to a number of disputes in insurance law and 
regulation that involve tensions between purchaser information 
 
 23. Under this exception, the ambiguity rule is not applied to cases with 
wealthy, powerful, or otherwise “sophisticated” policyholders. See Jeffrey W. 
Stempel, Reassessing the “Sophisticated” Policyholder Defense in Insurance 
Coverage Litigation, 42 DRAKE L. REV. 807, 832 (1993); see also Hazel Glenn 
Beh, Reassessing the Sophisticated Insured Exception, 39 TORT TRIAL & INS. 
PRAC. L.J. 85, 89 (2003). 
 24. See infra Part III.A. 
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and policy information. Finally, Part IV uses this Article’s 
framework to examine insurance law disputes that pit policy 
information against judicial information.25 
I.  THREE TYPES OF COVERAGE INFORMATION: 
PURCHASER INFORMATION, POLICY INFORMATION, 
AND JUDICIAL INFORMATION   
One important goal of insurance law and regulation is to 
promote accurate information among consumers, market in-
termediaries, and insurers themselves about the scope of cov-
erage that is afforded by different types of insurance products. 
For most types of insurance policies, this is hardly a simple 
task. Not only are insurance policies themselves immensely 
complex legal documents, but numerous different parties—
including insurance agents and brokers, insurers, regulators, 
and judges—regularly communicate to actual and prospective 
policyholders, as well as among themselves, regarding the pre-
cise scope of coverage that is afforded by different types of in-
surance policies. 
To better illuminate how insurance law and regulation 
play a part in the complex series of information flows regarding 
coverage information, this Part distinguishes among three dif-
ferent types of coverage information. The first form of coverage 
information is “purchaser information,” which consists of in-
formation communicated to policyholders about the terms of 
coverage at any point during the time period when they are 
purchasing that coverage. This encompasses the entire sales 
 
 25. While Part III focuses on conflicts between purchaser information and 
policy information, Part IV focuses on conflicts between policy information and 
judicial information. Omitted from the analysis are doctrinal disputes involv-
ing conflicts between purchaser information and judicial information. The ex-
planation for this omission is straightforward: in practice, there are few, if 
any, conflicts between doctrines that promote these sources of information. 
One exception may be when judicial information and policy information con-
flict, and policy information itself influences purchaser information. As de-
scribed below, this is likely only to be the case in markets involving very so-
phisticated policyholders. In any event, though, it is not clear that anything is 
gained analytically by separately considering purchaser information in this 
setting. Another way in which purchaser information and judicial information 
may interact is that certain judicially crafted default rules, such as the effi-
cient proximate cause rule, may be designed in part to match policyholders’ 
reasonable expectations of coverage. This approach to crafting default rules 
may improve purchaser information by making that information more likely to 
be accurate, in much the same way as the strong form of the reasonable expec-
tations doctrine. See infra Part I. 
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process, including completion of the policy application, delivery 
of the policy, and payment of the initial premium. Second, in-
surance law and regulation attempt to promote “policy infor-
mation,” which is information within the insurance policy itself 
about the coverage that is available for different losses. For the 
vast majority of policyholders who do not read and understand 
their insurance policies at the time of purchase, policy infor-
mation and purchaser information are generally non-
overlapping categories. Third, insurance law directly creates 
“judicial information,” which consists of information regarding 
insurers’ coverage obligations that is ascertainable only after 
researching information outside of the insurance policy, partic-
ularly judicial opinions and sources describing or synthesizing 
these opinions. 
A. INSURANCE LAW AND PURCHASER INFORMATION 
The most familiar form of coverage information consists of 
“purchaser information,” which can be defined as information 
about the general terms of coverage that is communicated to 
policyholders during the purchase process, either when cover-
age is first acquired or when it is renewed.26 For the vast major-
ity of policyholders, purchaser information is generally based 
on information received from insurance agents or brokers, in-
surers’ marketing, general media sources, and information 
from family, friends, and colleagues.27 For a small percentage of 
policyholders, particularly those that are relatively sophisticat-
ed commercial enterprises or who are advised by sophisticated 
brokers, the specific language in the policy may also provide 
purchaser information.28 
Numerous rules in insurance law and regulation are specif-
ically designed to promote accurate and robust purchaser in-
formation. For instance, under the doctrine of estoppel, a party 
to an insurance policy who “makes a promise or representation 
that can reasonably be expected to induce detrimental reliance 
by another party to the policy is estopped from denying the 
promise or representation if the other party does in fact rea-
sonably and detrimentally rely on that promise or representa-
 
 26. See Schwarcz, supra note 6, at 1412–19. 
 27. Id. 
 28. See supra note 23 and accompanying text; see also infra Part III.A. 
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tion.”29 The paradigmatic case of such estoppel involves a 
statement of an insurance agent made to the policyholder in 
the course of the sales process.30 Many courts historically re-
fused to apply estoppel where the agent’s statements were be-
ing used to expand coverage beyond that provided in the under-
lying insurance policy, but the recent trend has been to reject 
this approach.31 The doctrine thus promotes purchaser infor-
mation by inducing insurers and agents to take more care in 
how they describe policies in the sales process.32 
Another insurance law doctrine that is aimed principally at 
promoting purchaser information is the so-called “strong” form 
of the reasonable expectations doctrine, which has been adopt-
ed in approximately ten states.33 This doctrine provides that 
“[t]he objectively reasonable expectations of applicants and in-
tended beneficiaries regarding the terms of insurance contracts 
will be honored even though painstaking study of the policy 
provisions would have negated those expectations.”34 It thus al-
lows courts to refuse to honor unambiguous policy terms where 
doing so would undermine policyholders’ reasonable expecta-
tions of coverage.35 Courts are rarely explicit about what factors 
are relevant to determining policyholders’ “reasonable expecta-
tions of coverage.”36 But aside from the insurance policy itself, 
relevant factors generally include various forms of purchaser 
information, such as insurers’ marketing methods, agents’ oral 
 
 29. RESTATEMENT OF LIAB. INS. § 6 (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 1, 
2016). 
 30. See, e.g., ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 2, at 64–65, 74–78. 
 31. See RESTATEMENT OF LIAB. INS. § 6 (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft 
No. 1, 2016); ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 2, at 77–78. 
 32. See Daniel Schwarcz & Peter Siegelman, Insurance Agents in the 
Twenty-First Century: The Problem of Biased Advice, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK 
ON THE ECONOMICS OF INSURANCE LAW, supra note 19 at 61. 
 33. James Fischer, The Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations Is Indispen-
sable, If We Only Know What For?, 5 CONN. INS. L.J. 151, 155 (1998). For fur-
ther discussion of the reasonable expectations doctrine, see generally ROBERT 
H. JERRY II & DOUGLAS R. RICHMOND, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW 
§ 25D (5th ed. 2012) (discussing the origins, versions, and development of the 
reasonable expectations doctrine); Mark C. Rahdert, Reasonable Expectations 
Revisited, 5 CONN. INS. L.J. 107 (1998). For one recent attempt to disentangle 
the various different streams of the doctrine, see YONG QIANG HAN, POLICY-
HOLDER’S REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS (2016). 
 34. Keeton, supra note 6, at 967. 
 35. See Kenneth S. Abraham, Judge-Made Law and Judge-Made Insur-
ance: Honoring the Reasonable Expectations of the Insured, 67 VA. L. REV. 
1151, 1153–54 (1981). 
 36. See Schwarcz, supra note 6, at 1428–30. 
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statements, the product name of the insurance policy, and gen-
eral knowledge among consumers regarding insurance.37 
The strong form of the reasonable expectations doctrine 
can theoretically promote purchaser information through two 
different channels. First, the doctrine can promote purchaser 
information by altering the scope of coverage provided by in-
surance policies to match the information that is available to 
policyholders at the time of purchase. This mechanism does not 
directly impact consumers’ purchaser information, but instead 
increases the accuracy of that information by adjusting the 
scope of insurance coverage to match this information.38 Se-
cond, the doctrine could impact policyholders’ purchaser infor-
mation by inducing insurers and agents to alter the infor-
mation they convey to policyholders at the time of purchase in 
order to avoid or limit the application of the doctrine.39 For in-
stance, an insurer might ask a prospective policyholder to ini-
tial a specific exclusion that courts had previously suggested 
reasonable policyholders would not ordinarily expect. 
Although both estoppel and the strong reasonable expecta-
tions doctrine can thus promote purchaser information, they 
simultaneously run the risk of undermining policy information. 
Both doctrines tend to undermine the reliability of policy in-
formation by allowing it to be trumped by contrary purchaser 
information. 
Other elements of insurance law may promote purchaser 
information in ways that do not directly conflict with policy in-
formation. For instance, state laws and regulations governing 
the content of insurance policies can promote purchaser infor-
mation in a manner that parallels the strong form of the rea-
sonable expectations doctrine without directly undermining 
policy information.40 Depending on the line of coverage, insur-
ance laws in virtually every state prohibit some specific policy 
terms and mandate others.41 These rules are sometimes de-
signed to prevent insurance policies from containing surprising 
 
 37. See id. at 1393–94. 
 38. Of course, a major challenge with this approach is that it assumes 
that policyholders have actual and coherent expectations of coverage at the 
time of purchase, which may not always be true. See Jeffrey E. Thomas, An 
Interdisciplinary Critique of the Reasonable Expectations Doctrine, 5 CONN. 
INS. L.J. 295 (1998) (relying on consumer psychology research to investigate 
and challenge this assumption). 
 39. See Schwarcz, supra note 6, at 1432. 
 40. See id. at 1398–99. 
 41. See ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 2, at 142–43. 
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or unusual terms. Depending on the state and line of coverage, 
state regulators can also prohibit insurers from using insur-
ance policies that they deem objectionable because they contain 
terms that are “unfair,” “unreasonable,” “contrary to public pol-
icy,” or some combination of these broad standards.42 Some 
have suggested that regulators can and should operationalize 
these laws to help ensure that insurance policies contain terms 
that are consistent with policyholders’ reasonable expectations 
of coverage.43 State laws and regulations that do, in fact, pro-
hibit insurance policies from containing unreasonably surpris-
ing or unexpected terms promote purchaser information in a 
parallel manner to the strong form of the judicial doctrine: they 
increase the accuracy of purchaser information by requiring in-
surance policies to provide coverage consistent with that infor-
mation. 
Insurance laws and regulations requiring certain disclo-
sures and prohibiting misleading or deceptive sales practices 
can also promote purchaser information without interfering 
with policy information.44 Depending on the underlying cover-
age line and jurisdiction, state laws or regulations require in-
surers to provide consumers with disclosures at the time of pol-
icy issuance describing certain specific features of their 
coverage.45 For instance, a number of insurance regulations 
mandate that certain forms of disclosure—such as warnings 
that flood-related losses are not covered by most homeowners 
policies—be provided to the policyholder prior to purchase or at 
the time of policy delivery.46 Similarly, state laws and regula-
tions both broadly prohibit misleading or deceptive sales and 
marketing practices, and also more specifically regulate mar-
 
 42. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 27-14-9 (1975); GA. CODE ANN. § 33-24-10 
(2013); NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-7513 (2000). 
 43. See Kenneth S. Abraham, The Expectations Principle as a Regulative 
Ideal, 5 CONN. INS. L.J. 59, 61–62 (1999). 
 44. To be sure, the effectiveness of these efforts to promote purchaser in-
formation may, in many cases, be limited. See OMRI BEN-SHAHAR & CARL E. 
SCHNEIDER, MORE THAN YOU WANTED TO KNOW: THE FAILURE OF MANDATED 
DISCLOSURE 7–10 (2014). For a slightly less pessimistic view about the power 
of mandated disclosure in insurance, see Schwarcz, supra note 7 (discussing 
the benefits of increased transparency-oriented consumer protection regula-
tions and arguing for an increase in those regulations).  
 45. See Schwarcz, supra note 7, at 401. 
 46. See id. at 420 n.144. Although policy delivery is typically several 
weeks after purchase, state laws typically give the policyholder a period of 
time within which to cancel their purchase without cost after receiving these 
documents. 
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keting techniques that insurers or agents have historically used 
to mislead prospective policyholders, such as illustrations of 
how savings in certain life insurance policies may grow over 
time.47  
B. INSURANCE LAW AND POLICY INFORMATION 
A second central goal of insurance law and regulation is to 
promote more specific and clear information in the insurance 
policy itself about the precise scope of coverage that is available 
for specific types of losses. This form of coverage information 
can be referred to as “policy information.” Of course, for those 
policyholders who read and understand their insurance policies 
prior to or contemporaneous with purchasing coverage, policy 
information is merely a subset of purchaser information. The 
vast majority of insurance purchasers, however, generally do 
not fall within this category,48 rendering policy information and 
purchaser information largely independent categories. 
The first rule of insurance law—contra proferentem or the 
ambiguity rule—is insurance law’s most important effort to 
promote policy information.49 This rule provides that ambigu-
 
 47. See Douglas R. Richmond, Liability Issues in the Sale of Life Insur-
ance, 40 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 877 (2005). 
 48. See ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 2; Marotta-Wurgler, supra 
note 2. 
 49. To a lesser degree, the ambiguity rule also may promote purchaser 
information: it is more likely that policyholders who actually read their poli-
cies will understand them if insurers are drafting unambiguous policy lan-
guage. This is most obvious for those policyholders who actually read their in-
surance policy at or shortly after the time of purchase, a category of 
policyholders that is almost certainly likely to be quite small and heavily 
weighted towards more sophisticated commercial purchasers. See supra note 
46. Less ambiguous policy language may also promote purchaser information 
indirectly, to the extent that it facilitates market intermediaries’ capacity to 
inform policyholders about the specific contours of coverage related to that in-
formation. On the other hand, it is entirely possible that the ambiguity rule 
unintentionally undermines purchaser information by increasing the length 
and complexity of insurance policies. As insurance policies evolve, they tend to 
become longer and more complex to specifically address coverage issues that 
courts have found to be ambiguous, or that litigants have argued are ambigu-
ous. See Michael B. Rappaport, The Ambiguity Rule and Insurance Law: Why 
Insurance Contracts Should Not Be Construed Against the Drafter, 30 GA. L. 
REV. 171, 207–08 (1995) (arguing the ambiguity rule actually creates contracts 
that are more difficult to read). As insurance policies increase in length and 
complexity, the extent to which policyholders are inclined to review the under-
lying insurance policy will likely decrease, as does the likelihood that policy-
holders will extract relevant information from that policy when they do review 
it. See id. 
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ous policy language in an insurance policy should be interpret-
ed against the drafter.50 An insurance policy is generally con-
sidered ambiguous when “there is more than one meaning to 
which the language of the term is reasonably susceptible when 
applied to the claim in question, without reference to extrinsic 
evidence regarding the meaning of the term.”51 The central jus-
tification for the ambiguity rule is that it induces insurers to 
draft policy language more clearly.52 In this sense, the rule op-
erates as a “penalty default rule”—a rule that encourages the 
more informed party (the insurer) to convey information to the 
less informed party (the policyholder) by filling in contractual 
gaps (ambiguities) in a way that is less favorable to the more 
informed party.53 
The ambiguity rule does indeed promote better policy in-
formation, as evidenced by the numerous instances in which 
insurers have redrafted their policies to address court-found 
ambiguities. For example, property insurance policies common-
ly provide coverage for the collapse of an insured building, 
which they define to require “an abrupt falling down or caving 
in of a building.”54 In 2009, a court found this language to be 
ambiguous due to its confusing formatting, and thus extended 
coverage to a hotel that had dropped between three and six 
inches as a result of wood decay.55 The updated 2010 version of 
 
 50. ALLAN D. WINDT, 2 INSURANCE CLAIMS & DISPUTES § 6:2 (6th ed. 
2013). 
 51. JEFFREY W. STEMPEL & ERIK S. KNUTSEN, STEMPEL AND KNUTSEN ON 
INSURANCE COVERAGE 4-101 (4th ed. 2016) (quoting RESTATEMENT OF LIAB. 
INS. § 4(1) (AM. LAW INST., Discussion Draft 2015)).  
 52. Cf. supra note 50. This is not effective as a consumer protection vehi-
cle, however, because there is no reason to think that ambiguous terms are 
those that are substantively problematic. See Rappaport, supra note 49, at 
224. 
 53. On penalty default rules generally, see generally Ian Ayres, Ya-HUH: 
There Are and Should Be Penalty Defaults, 33 FLA. ST. L. REV. 589 (2006); 
Ayres & Gertner, supra note 5. On the ambiguity rule as a type of penalty de-
fault rule, see Abraham, supra note 5, at 545–46; Baker & Logue, supra note 
19, at 389–90; Boardman supra note 5, at 316. Contra proferentem is clearly a 
default rule in the sense that insurers are typically permitted to respond to a 
court’s determination that policy language is ambiguous by redrafting the lan-
guage to clearly exclude the loss at issue in a particular case. It is a much 
more complicated and unsettled question whether contra proferentem is also a 
default rule in the sense that an insurer could instruct in the contract that 
courts should not apply the rule to resolve coverage disputes. See Baker & 
Logue, supra note 19, at 389–90. 
 54. INS. SERVS. OFFICE, INC., H0 00 03 10 00, HOMEOWNERS 3 – SPECIAL 
FORM (1999). 
 55. Malbco Holdings, LLC v. AMCO Ins. Co., 629 F. Supp. 2d 1185, 1196–
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the Insurance Services Office (ISO) Homeowners Policy there-
after changed the formatting of the collapse section by separat-
ing the definition of collapse from the exclusions to collapse.56 
Similarly, in Owners Insurance Co. v. Clayton,57 a liability in-
surer refused to cover a policyholder-employer who was suc-
cessfully sued by a terminated employee for malicious prosecu-
tion, slander, and negligence.58 The insurer relied on an 
“employer-related practices” exclusion in its policy, which lim-
ited coverage for liability relating to employment practices such 
as hiring and firing.59 The court rejected this claim, reasoning 
that the exclusion did not clearly exclude coverage for suits in-
volving statements made after an employee’s termination to 
her new business associates regarding the circumstances of her 
earlier termination.60 After this case, the 2007 Commercial 
General Liability (CGL) policy was revised to exclude coverage 
for wrongful employment practices even if the injury causing 
event occurs before, during, or after employment.61 
To be sure, the ambiguity rule is not always successful in 
inducing insurers to clarify the terms of their insurance poli-
cies. Indeed, there are numerous well-known instances in 
which insurers have been notably reluctant to redraft insur-
ance policy language that courts have found to be ambiguous.62 
In such instances, insurers have presumably decided that they 
can live with a pro-coverage result for the subset of policyholder 
claims that closely resemble cases where the relevant policy 
 
97 (D. Or. 2009) (“Viewing subsection (a) in the context of the other three sub-
sections does not [add clarity] . . . . [B]oth subsections (c) and (d) exclude cer-
tain conditions . . . rendering [subsection (a)] ambiguous.”). 
 56. INS. SERVS. OFFICE, INC., H0 00 03 05 11, HOMEOWNERS 3 – SPECIAL 
FORM (2010). 
 57. Owners Ins. Co. v. Clayton, 614 S.E.2d 611, 613 (S.C. 2005). 
 58. Id.  
 59. Id. at 614–15. 
 60. Id. at 615. 
 61. INS. SERVS. OFFICE, INC., CG 00 01 12 07, COMMERCIAL GENERAL LI-
ABILITY COVERAGE FORM (2007). Even though the ambiguity rule can result in 
insurance contracts containing more information, this does not necessarily 
mean the insured will get a better outcome. In Clayton, the court held the in-
surance company was responsible for paying the claim. See Clayton, 614 
S.E.2d at 615. An insured would not likely receive coverage under the same 
circumstances with the new 2007 CGL policy. 
 62. See Michelle E. Boardman, Contra Proferentem: The Allure of Ambig-
uous Boilerplate, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1105, 1115 (2006) (discussing how insur-
ance companies frequently do not redraft policy language once it has been in-
terpreted by a court, but instead rely on the court’s interpretation in the 
future). 
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language was deemed ambiguous.63 Moreover, as with more 
specific penalty default rules, an insurer can simply price the 
cost this rule produces into its coverage.64 This option might be 
particularly attractive to the extent that an insurer believes 
that courts or regulators would rebuff insurers’ attempts to 
clarify policy language that was previously found to be ambigu-
ous. 
Although the ambiguity rule likely does improve policy in-
formation, it also has the potential to undermine purchaser in-
formation, a possibility that is rarely, if ever, recognized by 
courts. This is because the ambiguity rule tends to increase the 
length and complexity of insurance policy language as insurers 
include more and more information in their policies to address 
specific scenarios to which courts have extended coverage on 
the basis of contra proferentem. Longer and more complex con-
tracts are obviously less likely to be read and understood by 
purchasers. 
The ambiguity rule is not the only potential “penalty de-
fault” rule in insurance law that can promote clearer and more 
specific policy information. As noted in the introduction, insur-
ance law includes a large number of quite specific default 
rules.65 In some (but not all) cases, these doctrines can be un-
derstood to constitute penalty default rules because they are 
generally unfavorable to the insurer and part of courts’ justifi-
cation for these rules is that insurers can choose to alter their 
policy language to produce an alternative result. For instance, 
many insurance policies do not contain any language discussing 
whether the insurer’s subrogation rights allow it to recover 
from a policyholder’s judgment against a tortfeasor when this 
would result in the policyholder not being fully compensated for 
her loss.66 As its name suggests, the “make-whole” rule requires 
that the policyholder be made whole before the insurer can re-
cover in subrogation. One rationale for this pro-policyholder 
rule is that insurers can redraft policy language to clarify that 
they are entitled to first-dollar subrogation if, in fact, the make-
 
 63. This might be because they would ultimately choose to draft language 
that matches the result reached by application of the ambiguity rule, or else 
because the benefits that would flow from their preferred language would be 
outweighed by the costs and uncertainty associated with redrafting the policy 
language. 
 64. See Boardman, supra note 62, at 1118. 
 65. See supra text accompanying notes 16–18. 
 66. See Daniel Schwarcz, Reevaluating Standardized Insurance Policies, 
78 U. CHI. L. REV. 1263, 1294 (2011). 
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whole rule is not efficient or consistent with the parties’ true 
preferences. 
In addition to contra proferentem and other penalty de-
fault rules, various “weak” forms of the reasonable expectations 
doctrine are also designed primarily to enhance policy infor-
mation. In contrast to the “strong” form of the doctrine de-
scribed above, courts applying a weak version of the doctrine 
consider policyholders’ reasonable expectations of coverage only 
after determining that the relevant policy language is ambigu-
ous.67 Courts applying this version of the doctrine typically em-
phasize that it requires policy language to “be construed as 
laymen would understand [it] and not according to the inter-
pretation of sophisticated underwriters.”68 Relevant considera-
tions include whether the operative terms are “hidden” within 
the policy or contained in portions of the policy that are not ob-
viously related to the underlying coverage issue, such as the 
definitions section.69 
Weak versions of the reasonable expectations rule promote 
policy information not by eliminating ambiguities, but by dis-
couraging undue complexity that could impede a reader’s ca-
pacity to understand the meaning of an insurance policy. Theo-
retically, the doctrine encourages insurers to draft their policies 
more clearly so that a reasonable policyholder who is motivated 
to read it can discern its meaning.70 This is because, to the ex-
tent that insurers instead use hyper-technical language that 
ordinary individuals would misunderstand or not be able to 
understand one way or another, the insurer’s preferred mean-
ing is less likely to prevail. 
Certain state insurance laws and regulations also are pri-
marily designed to promote policy information. Most states re-
quire insurance policy language to meet a specific quantitative 
measure of word and sentence complexity, which is typically 
 
 67. See, e.g., Burton v. Ky. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 326 S.W.3d 474, 
476 (Ky. Ct. App. 2010) (holding that the reasonable expectation doctrine ap-
plies only when a policy is susceptible to two different interpretations). 
 68. See, e.g., id.; Vt. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Walukiewicz, 966 A.2d 672, 672 
(Conn. 2009). 
 69. See Atwater Creamery Co. v. W. Nat. Mut. Ins. Co., 366 N.W.2d 271, 
276 (Minn. 1985) (finding coverage for insured where “the burglary definition 
at issue . . . constitute[d] a rather hidden exclusion from coverage”). 
 70. See, e.g., Lancaster v. U.S. Shoe Corp., 934 F. Supp. 1137, 1159 (N.D. 
Cal. 1996) (“[A]pplication of the reasonable expectations doctrine to the same 
plans promotes the goal of giving insurers sufficient incentives to clearly 
communicate meanings of policy clauses and exclusions to insureds.”). 
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based on the Flesch-Kincaid Reading Ease Score.71 To varying 
degrees, state laws also require that policies contain a table of 
contents, “self-contained and independent” sections, be written 
in no less than ten-point font, and “use everyday, conversation-
al language.”72 State regulators typically enforce these rules—
and similar prohibitions on “misleading,” “ambiguous,” or “con-
fusing”73 policy language—by individually reviewing and ap-
proving insurance policies.74 According to state regulators, the-
se rules ensure “that [policyholders’] rights and responsibilities, 
and those of the insurance company, are clearly stated” in the 
underlying policy.75 
C. INSURANCE LAW AND JUDICIAL INFORMATION 
In addition to promoting “purchaser information” and “pol-
icy information,” a third fundamental goal of insurance law is 
to promote “judicial information,” which can be defined as in-
formation regarding the scope of insurers’ coverage obligations 
that is only ascertainable from judicial opinions or secondary 
sources summarizing these opinions. Judicial information in-
cludes the various insurance-specific default rules that indicate 
how issues that are not explicitly addressed in an insurance 
policy should be resolved.76 But it also includes judicially craft-
ed tests for how particular policy terms or phrases should be 
applied, so long as these tests or definitions are not themselves 
readily apparent from the insurance policy itself. Examples of 
this type of judicial information include the “efficient proximate 
 
 71. See NONPERSONAL LINES PROP. AND CAS. INS. POLICY SIMPLIFICATION 
MODEL REGULATION: 732-1 (NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS 1997), http://www 
.naic.org/store/free/MDL-732.pdf. 
 72. See Schwarcz, supra note 7, at 421. 
 73. See id. at 406–07. 
 74. See Stephen P. D’Arcy, Insurance Price Deregulation: The Illinois Ex-
perience, in DEREGULATING PROPERTY-LIABILITY INSURANCE: RESTORING 
COMPETITION AND INCREASING MARKET EFFICIENCY 248, 256–58 (J. David 
Cummins ed., 2002). 
 75. NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, A CONSUMER’S GUIDE TO HOME INSUR-
ANCE (2010), http://www.naic.org/documents/consumer_guide_home.pdf. 
 76. The scope of a liability insurer’s duty to defend would fit in this cate-
gory of default rule, as the issue is largely unaddressed in many liability in-
surance policies. In almost all cases, these rules are default rules rather than 
mandatory rules, as courts generally permit insurers to contract around these 
defaults, particularly when the policyholder is sophisticated. For an excellent 
discussion of the limited circumstances in which the rules of insurance law 
should operate as mandatory rules rather than default rules, see Baker & 
Logue, supra note 19. 
  
2017] COVERAGE INFORMATION 1477 
 
cause rule” to determine whether a peril “caused” a loss, or the 
“unfortunate event” test for determining the number of “occur-
rences” in a liability insurance case.77 
Judicial information regarding contracting parties’ obliga-
tions is unusually robust in insurance.78 This is because insur-
ance policies that are issued by any single company often con-
tain similar language and structure as insurance policies 
issued by other companies.79 Property/casualty insurance poli-
cies, for instance, incorporate a substantial amount of content 
that is derived from the collective drafting efforts of competing 
insurers.80 Some property/casualty insurers simply use these 
collectively drafted documents for their policies, whereas many 
others use altered versions.81 Even outside of the proper-
ty/casualty context, insurance policy terms are often standard-
ized to some extent due to state regulatory rules as well as his-
torical trends.82 For instance, virtually every health insurance 
policy in the country only covers care that is “medically neces-
sary.”83 
The common evolution and structure of insurance policies 
means that a court’s development of default rules or tests in 
one dispute can provide concrete guidance for the resolution of 
other disputes implicating similar or identical issues. In this 
way, judicial opinions resolving insurance disputes are similar 
 
 77. See ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 2, at 493. 
 78. See RESTATEMENT OF LIAB. INS. § 2 (AM. LAW INST., Discussion Draft 
2015); id. § 2 cmt. b (“Judicial decisions regarding the interpretation of stand-
ard-form terms provide guidance regarding the application of the terms in 
other cases.”); see also Abraham, supra note 6, at 664–65. Judicially created 
rules used to resolve disputes in insurance contracts are regulatory in nature 
and go beyond what is used to interpret non-insurance contracts. Id. 
 79. See ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 2, at 36 (noting that the In-
surance and Services Organization (ISO) permits member organizations to 
use—in part or in full—any of their collectively drafted forms in operation). 
 80. See JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, 1 LAW OF INSURANCE CONTRACT DISPUTES 
§ 4.06[b] (2d ed. & Supp. 2005); Susan Randall, Freedom of Contract in Insur-
ance, 14 CONN. INS. L.J. 107, 124 (2007). Operating under an express exemp-
tion from federal antitrust law, insurers routinely collaborate under the auspi-
ces of third-party organizations such as the Insurance Services Organization 
(ISO) to collectively draft and update various insurance policy forms. Id.  
 81. See Schwarcz, supra note 9, at 1342. 
 82. See ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 2, at 36–37. 
 83. Timothy P. Blanchard, “Medical Necessity” Determinations: A Contin-
uing Healthcare Policy Problem, 37 J. HEALTH L. 599, 600 (2004). (“[Most 
plans] require that services in the potentially covered categories be ‘reasona-
ble’ and ‘necessary’ (or similar terms) for the particular patient’s medical con-
dition.”).  
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to cases involving the meaning of contested statutes: in both in-
stances, the operative language applies to countless potential 
disputes beyond the specific fact pattern facing the court.84 All 
this might be of little importance if insurance coverage disputes 
were rare. But, of course, quite the opposite is true: at least 
outside of the context of life insurance, coverage disputes are 
quite common.85 For these reasons, extensive case law is typi-
cally available that is relevant to assessing how any particular 
loss should be assessed under any particular type of insurance 
policy.86 
To be sure, judicial information exists in ordinary contract 
law, generally in the form of default rules that rely on broad 
standards such as “commercial reasonableness.”87 But judicial 
information is often much more specific in insurance law.88 In 
that sense, judicial information in insurance is analogous to the 
approach used in code countries, where various default terms 
and definitions are specified in code and do not need to be in-
corporated into contract.89 Indeed, the various default rules and 
judicially crafted tests of insurance law have recently been dis-
tilled into a draft Restatement of Liability Insurance Project, 
which is scheduled for completion in 2017.90 Although not itself 
law, the project moves American insurance law even closer to a 
code-based system, by crystallizing the judicial information in-
surance law generates so that this information can operate as a 
common frame of reference for courts, scholars, regulators, and 
lawyers.91 As discussed at length in Part IV, strategies designed 
 
 84. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF LIAB. INS. § 3 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST., 
Discussion Draft 2012) (“Adjudication of the meaning of a standard form term 
in one case has consequences for the scope of the risks insured under all simi-
lar policies.”); see generally Jeffrey Stempel, The Insurance Policy as Statute, 
41 McGeorge L. Rev. 203 (2010). 
 85. See Daniel Schwarcz, Redesigning Consumer Dispute Resolution: A 
Case Study of the British and American Approaches to Insurance Claims Con-
flict, 83 TUL. L. REV. 735, 751 (2009). 
 86. See, e.g., Freidberg v. Chubb & Son, Inc., 691 F.3d 948, 952 (8th Cir. 
2012); Macheca Trans. v. Phila. Indem. Ins. Co., 649 F.3d 661, 670–72 (8th 
Cir. 2011); Nathe Bros., Inc. v. Am. Nat. Fire Ins. Co., 615 N.W.2d 341, 344 
(Minn. 2000). 
 87. See Allan Schwartz & Robert Scott, The Common Law of Contract and 
the Default Rule Project, 102 VA. L. REV. 1523, 1577 (2016). 
 88. See Abraham, supra note 6, at 665–66. 
 89. See Richard A. Posner, The Law and Economics of Contract Interpre-
tation, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1581, 1586 (2004). 
 90. See RESTATEMENT OF LIAB. INS. (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 
1, 2016). 
 91. See id. 
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to improve judicial information often directly undermine policy 
information, a reality that has important and generally unrec-
ognized implications for the structure of insurance law.92 
*** 
The three types of coverage information—purchaser infor-
mation, policy information, and judicial information—are 
summarized below in Table 1. Table 1 also describes the prima-
ry sources of each type of information. For policy information 
and judicial information, these sources follow naturally from 
the definitions of these terms. By contrast, the sources of pur-
chaser information are quite variable, as the definition of pur-
chaser information is based on the intended audience for that 
information (the purchaser), rather than the source of that in-
formation. Finally, Table 1 summarizes the various ways in 
which insurance law and regulation seek to promote each form 
of coverage information. 
 
 92. See infra Part IV. 
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Table 1: Types of Coverage Information 
 Purchaser In-formation: 
Policy Infor-
mation: 
Judicial In-
formation: 
Definition 
Information about 
the scope of cover-
age that is com-
municated to poli-
cyholders at any 
point during the 
purchasing pro-
cess. 
Information 
about the scope 
of coverage that 
is in the insur-
ance policy. 
Information 
about the scope 
of coverage that 
is available only 
after legal re-
search. 
Primary 
Sources of 
Information 
(i) Insurance 
agent; (ii) friends 
and family; (iii) 
experience and 
background as-
sumptions; (iv) in-
surer advertising 
and marketing. 
(i) Insurance 
policy; (ii) sec-
ondary sources 
quoting or de-
scribing policy 
language. 
(i) Judicial deci-
sions regarding 
coverage dis-
putes; (ii) sec-
ondary sources 
describing judi-
cial decisions. 
Laws and 
Regulations 
Promoting 
(i) Estoppel; (ii) 
strong reasonable 
expectations doc-
trine; (iii) form 
regulation; (iv) 
disclosure and 
false marketing/ 
advertising. 
(i) Ambiguity 
rule; (ii) weak 
reasonable ex-
pectations doc-
trine; (iii) form 
review; (iv) 
readability 
rules. 
(i) Insurance-
specific default 
rules; 
(ii) judicially 
crafted tests for 
applying policy 
terms. 
 
II.  RATIONALES FOR LAWS AND REGULATIONS THAT 
PROMOTE THE THREE TYPES OF COVERAGE 
INFORMATION   
Each of the three forms of coverage information described 
in Part I—purchaser information, policy information, and judi-
cial information—serve potentially important and under-
appreciated roles in promoting the efficient operation of insur-
ance markets. For this reason, insurance law and regulation 
can, in a variety of settings, potentially improve insurance 
markets by promoting coverage information. Yet limited analy-
sis exists in the extant literature systematically laying out the 
  
2017] COVERAGE INFORMATION 1481 
 
rationales for these rules. This Part seeks to fill this gap by il-
luminating the various potential market benefits that insur-
ance law and regulation can achieve by affirmatively promoting 
purchaser information, policy information, and judicial infor-
mation. As Parts III and IV aim to demonstrate, this is not 
simply a theoretical exercise. Instead, appreciating the poten-
tial market benefits of rules promoting different types of cover-
age information can provide new insights on a number of im-
portant doctrinal and regulatory issues. 
A. RATIONALES FOR PROMOTING PURCHASER INFORMATION IN 
INSURANCE MARKETS 
Information about coverage that is provided to policyhold-
ers during the purchasing process plays a vital role in all in-
surance markets. As with any product market, purchaser in-
formation can promote product quality, facilitate consumer 
choice, and encourage effective product use. The first of these 
benefits—its capacity to promote more efficient coverage—is 
more theoretical than real in insurance markets involving indi-
vidual purchasers, though it is likely quite important in insur-
ance markets where most purchasers are represented by so-
phisticated insurance brokers. The latter two benefits of 
purchaser information provide broader, and more insurance-
specific, payoffs. By facilitating policyholder selection of policy 
types and features, purchaser information allows insurers to 
use contract design to counteract adverse selection. And by 
promoting the effective use of insurance, purchaser information 
can reduce moral hazard by inducing policyholders to avoid de-
cisions or behaviors that can jeopardize their coverage. After 
briefly discussing the capacity of purchaser information to 
promote generally efficient coverage, this Section focuses on 
these two more insurance-specific benefits of purchaser infor-
mation. 
1. Promoting More Efficient Insurance Policies 
Purchaser information has long been understood to be a 
potentially important tool for ensuring that contracts of adhe-
sion are drafted to maximize the welfare of the contracting par-
ties.93 According to standard law and economic models, drafters 
 
 93. Purchaser information is also important for assent-based theories of 
contractual assent. See, e.g., KARL LLEWELYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 
— DECIDING APPEALS 370–71 (1960); Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: 
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of contracts of adhesion will have an incentive to draft relative-
ly efficient contracts if a sufficiently large number of consumers 
are informed about the content of those contracts at the time 
they agree to them and drafters cannot differentiate between 
sophisticated and unsophisticated purchasers.94 Of course, sub-
stantial debate exists regarding how large an informed minori-
ty is needed in order for firms to draft efficient terms and how 
often these conditions are met in different commercial con-
texts.95 Moreover, recent work in behavioral law and economics 
suggests that even fully informed individuals may make sys-
temic errors when processing relevant information, which can 
incentivize drafters to increase complexity and devise strate-
gies to capture consumer surplus.96 
All of these issues are directly applicable to insurance poli-
cies, which are one type of contract of adhesion.97 Although the 
contract of adhesion label is most apt for insurance policies that 
are sold to individuals, even insurance policies that are sold to 
relatively sophisticated businesses generally meet the basic pa-
rameters of a contract of adhesion.98 At the very least, such pol-
icies usually contain language that is not individually negotiat-
ed between the two parties and is offered by insurers on a take-
it-or-leave-it basis.99 
 
An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1173, 1226–27 (1983).  
 94. But cf. Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Imperfect Information in 
Markets for Contract Terms: The Examples of Warranties and Security Inter-
ests, 69 VA. L. REV. 1387, 1390 (1983) (“If consumers are instead ignorant of 
market opportunities, firms may respond by degrading contract quality.”).  
 95. See R. Ted Cruz & Jeffrey J. Hinck, Not My Brother’s Keeper: The Ina-
bility of an Informed Minority To Correct for Imperfect Information, 47 
HASTINGS L.J. 635, 675 (1996). The percentage of consumers needed for insur-
ers to draft efficient terms could range from one percent to ninety percent. Id. 
Additional factors of significance in drafting efficient terms are “the cost sav-
ings to the producer of the inefficient terms and the amount of profit that the 
producer makes on informed consumers given an efficient set of terms.” Id. 
 96. See OREN BAR-GILL, SEDUCTION BY CONTRACT: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND 
PSYCHOLOGY IN CONSUMER MARKETS 18 (2012). 
 97. See, e.g., ROBERT H. JERRY, II & DOUGLAS R. RICHMOND, UNDER-
STANDING INSURANCE LAW 141 (5th ed. 2012); JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, STEMPEL 
ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS § 4.06[b] (3d ed. 2011); Friedrich Kessler, Con-
tracts of Adhesion—Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. 
REV. 629, 631 (1943); W. David Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Demo-
cratic Control of Lawmaking Power, 84 HARV. L. REV. 529, 545–46 (1971) 
(identifying insurance policies as paradigmatic contracts of adhesion). 
 98. See Slawson, supra note 97, at 539 (defining a contract of adhesion). 
 99. See Posner, supra note 89; see, e.g., Farmers Auto. Ins. Ass’n v. St. 
Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 482 F.3d 976, 978 (7th Cir. 2007) (“Any insured, 
whether large and sophisticated or not, must enter into a contract with the 
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In practice, purchaser information likely has only a limited 
capacity to promote efficient insurance policies in markets 
characterized by individual purchasers. This is for a variety of 
reasons, including the pervasiveness of consumer biases re-
garding insurance and the capacity of insurers to offer different 
products to sophisticated and unsophisticated policyholders.100 
But perhaps the most important reason is that consumers will 
inevitably only have limited purchaser information about a few 
key features of their coverage.101 After all, many consumers by-
pass market intermediaries entirely when purchasing coverage, 
or else use market intermediaries who only sell coverage from a 
single carrier.102 And those consumers that do secure coverage 
through independent market intermediaries often receive lim-
ited amounts of information about competing coverage options, 
in part because these intermediaries generally do not owe any 
legal obligations of loyalty or care to consumers with respect to 
the selection of coverage options.103 Finally, almost no ordinary 
insurance consumer actually reads and understands his or her 
policy at the time of purchase.104 
By contrast, purchaser information likely has greater po-
tential to promote efficient insurance policies in markets char-
acterized by relatively sophisticated commercial policyholders. 
These purchasers typically acquire coverage through “insur-
ance brokers,” who are usually very well informed about the de-
tails of different coverage options and the potential alternatives 
that are available in the marketplace.105 Moreover, unlike ordi-
nary insurance agents, the brokers that serve commercial poli-
 
insurer which is written according to the insurer’s pleasure by the insurer. 
Generally, since little or no negotiation occurs in this process, the insurer has 
total control of the terms and the drafting of the contract.”). 
 100. See Schwarcz, supra note 6, at 1412–13 (describing the ways in which 
consumers determine which insurance policies to purchase). 
 101. See id. (“At the same time, these informational sources are limited in 
their capacity to convey nuanced policy information to consumers.”). 
 102. See id. at 1415–16 (citing studies that show that less than half of peo-
ple relied on agents to learn about different insurance coverage options). 
 103. See id. at 1417 (“They therefore have a tendency to focus on the posi-
tive elements of coverage, telling ‘stories’ that, while technically accurate, 
gloss over many of the less salient ways in which a policy limits coverage.”). 
 104. Moreover, more recent work in behavioral law and economics suggests 
that even fully informed individuals may make systemic errors when pro-
cessing relevant information that incentivizes drafters to increase complexity 
and devise strategies to appropriate consumer surplus. See BAR-GILL, supra 
note 96, at 19; Marotta-Wurgler, supra note 2, at 98.  
 105. See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Reassessing the “Sophisticated” Policyholder 
Defense in Insurance Coverage Litigation, 42 DRAKE L. REV. 807, 808 (1993). 
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cyholders are generally legally obligated to provide their clients 
with unbiased and competent advice.106 
2. Promoting Matching Between Policyholders and Policies, 
and Limiting Adverse Selection 
In addition to promoting efficient contracts, purchaser in-
formation can help ensure that individuals select contracts that 
best match their preferences and needs. This generic benefit of 
purchaser information is particularly important in insurance 
markets. One important way that insurance policies attempt to 
counteract the risk of adverse selection is by limiting coverage 
for risks that are unusual or highly variable and cannot be eas-
ily identified and assessed ex ante through standard underwrit-
ing techniques.107 Assuming that policyholders have purchaser 
information about these exclusions, they are forced to either 
forego insurance for losses associated with any non-standard 
risks they face, or to seek out particularized coverage for these 
risks via an endorsement or additional policy.108 In the latter 
case, policyholders indirectly reveal to their insurer that they 
potentially pose non-standard risks associated with the particu-
lar supplemental coverage sought. This, in turn, prompts the 
insurer to engage in more specific and detailed underwriting 
appropriate for that risk, and to allocate the costs of such un-
derwriting only to the subset of policyholders for whom it is 
truly necessary.109 
But this logic simply does not work when policyholders do 
not have any purchaser information about the relevant exclu-
sion. In such cases, policyholders presenting non-standard risks 
do not seek out supplemental coverage simply because they are 
ignorant that their non-standard risks are not covered in the 
 
 106. See Hazel Beh & Amanda M. Willis, Insurance Intermediaries, 15 
CONN. INS. L.J. 571, 579–81 (2009). 
 107. See, e.g., Weedo v. Stone-E-Brick, Inc., 405 A.2d 788, 792 (N.J. 1979) 
(noting that one rationale for a CGI policy to exclude liability stemming from 
faulty work product is to prevent adverse selection). 
 108. See ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 2, at 232; see also George L. 
Priest, A Theory of the Consumer Product Warranty, 90 YALE L.J. 1297, 1315 
(1981) (describing the ways in which risk adjusters seek to eliminate differ-
ences in risk, which forces people at the margins to face coverage decisions). 
 109. See Michael Rothschild & Joseph Stiglitz, Equilibrium in Competitive 
Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information, 90 Q. 
J. ECON. 629, 642 (1976). Although the Rothschild and Stiglitz model produces 
self-sorting as a result of different deductible levels, insurers generally imple-
ment this basic approach through the more direct method of limiting coverage 
for specific high-risk activities that are difficult to underwrite uniformly. 
  
2017] COVERAGE INFORMATION 1485 
 
purchased policy. This can result in risk-averse policyholders 
that pose unusual or non-generalizable risks foregoing coverage 
for which they would be willing to pay and which insurers 
would be willing to sell after enhanced underwriting.110 
Consider an example. Standard homeowners insurance pol-
icies generally contain a dollar cap on the amount of coverage 
that is available for theft of jewelry.111 Policyholders who own 
and wish to insure expensive jewelry can simply purchase an 
endorsement to extend their coverage. This structure protects 
the insurer against adverse selection, because policyholders 
vary greatly in the amount of expensive jewelry they own, and 
insurers’ standard underwriting techniques could not reliably 
and cheaply identify such jewelry ownership. Without the cov-
erage exclusion, adverse selection could result in those who do 
not own expensive jewelry selecting a different insurer or decid-
ing to forego insurance altogether rather than paying insurance 
premiums used, in part, to subsidize the losses of those who 
own expensive jewelry. Insurers avoid such adverse selection 
by simply excluding coverage for expensive jewelry, and relying 
on policyholders with such jewelry to affirmatively seek cover-
age and reveal their high-risk status.112 But if policyholders are 
unaware of the exclusion in the base policy, then those with ex-
pensive jewelry end up without insurance protection for which 
they would have been willing to pay. 
To be clear, none of this is to suggest that purchaser infor-
mation relating to adverse selection is systematically concealed 
or unavailable to policyholders. To the contrary, both insurers 
and insurance agents often have good reason to provide policy-
holders with this type of purchaser information.113 For insurers, 
this may allow them to sell additional coverage to individuals 
who present non-traditional risks, and for insurance agents 
this may generate additional commissions. At the same time, 
however, it is hardly clear that these incentives are sufficient to 
produce optimal investments in providing purchasers with ac-
curate purchaser information that is linked to adverse selection 
 
 110. See Rothschild & Stiglitz, supra note 109, at 629 (“[I]f individuals 
were willing or able to reveal their information, everybody could be made bet-
ter off.”). 
 111. See, e.g., INS. SERVS. OFFICE, INC., HO 00 03 05 11 4, HOMEOWNERS 3 – 
SPECIAL FORM (2011) (limiting losses for jewelry theft to $1500). 
 112. Tom Baker, Containing the Promise of Insurance: Adverse Selection 
and Risk Classification, 9 CONN. INS. L.J. 371, 381 (2003). 
 113. See id. at 378. 
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concerns. Insurers, for instance, can still charge low premiums 
to those who don’t buy supplemental coverage even if those in-
dividuals are in fact high-risk, because their coverage does not 
extend to their high-risk activities.114 Moreover, insurers face 
obvious countervailing pressures to present the image to pro-
spective customers that their coverage is as broad as possible.115 
Similarly, insurance agents who try to sell prospective policy-
holders on purchasing additional supplemental coverage may 
risk losing customers to competing carriers/agents who offer 
cheaper coverage.116 And, of course, insurance agents may be 
neglected or bypassed entirely in the purchasing process.117 For 
all these reasons, law and regulation have a legitimate interest 
in promoting purchaser information to ensure that insurers’ ef-
forts to combat adverse selection do not leave policyholders 
without coverage for which they would be willing to pay. 
3. Impacting Policyholder Behavior and Reducing Moral 
Hazard 
Another generic benefit of purchaser information for all 
contracts of adhesion is that such information can allow con-
sumers to effectively adjust their behavior in light of their 
rights and obligations under the contract. Once again, this is-
sue is particularly important in the insurance context, where a 
core purpose of many insurance policy terms is to counteract 
moral hazard.118 Insurance policies typically seek to limit moral 
hazard by excluding coverage for risks that are substantially 
within policyholders’ control, or losses that are highly correlat-
ed with these activities.119 Doing so, the argument goes, induces 
policyholders to take appropriate levels of care by forcing them 
to bear the costs of failing to do so, at least in particularly ex-
treme or easily identifiable cases.120 
 
 114. See id. at 381. 
 115. See Schwarcz, supra note 6, at 1410. 
 116. See Schwarcz, supra note 7, at 432. 
 117. See Schwarcz, supra note 6, at 1416 (“In 2001, 40% of consumers re-
lied on insurance agents to learn about automobile insurance.”). 
 118. See ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 2, at 7. 
 119. For example, many auto policies will not cover damage to cars that are 
used for a pre-arranged race or competitive speed contest because it is an unu-
sually risky activity. See, e.g., Detroit Auto. Inter-Ins. Exch. v. Bishop, 180 
N.W.2d 35, 37 (Mich. Ct. App. 1970). 
 120. See ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 2, at 7 (“[T]hey fashion the 
terms so that unusual risks are not insured by standard policies and so that 
the results of inordinately dangerous behaviors are not insured.”). 
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But policyholders’ levels of care or activity obviously cannot 
be impacted by coverage exclusions about which policyholders 
are unaware at the time they select their levels of activity or 
care. One particularly nice illustration of this point is a recent 
study demonstrating that valued policy laws—which allow poli-
cyholders to profit from total losses on over-insured property—
do not, in fact, create moral hazard.121 The best explanation for 
this finding is that these laws do not impact policyholder incen-
tives for the simple reason that the vast majority of policyhold-
ers are ignorant of their existence.122 
Because the risk of moral hazard only exists when the in-
surer does not observe policyholder levels of activity or care af-
ter purchase, the only clear opportunity for the insurer to in-
form policyholders of coverage exclusions that might impact 
these decisions is at the time of purchase. To be sure, there 
may certainly be cases when potential changes in policyholders’ 
activities prompt policyholders to check their coverage after 
purchase, either by directly consulting their policy or inquiring 
about their coverage with their agent or insurer. But policy-
holders will only be prompted to check their insurance coverage 
if they have a preexisting awareness of the possibility that spe-
cific activities might not be covered.123 Purchaser information, 
therefore, serves a critical role in helping to ensure that cover-
age exclusions designed to counteract moral hazard have their 
intended effect. 
When an individual policyholder is unaware of a coverage 
exclusion aimed at moral hazard, the impact of that exclusion 
is not to reduce moral hazard at all, but simply to shift the 
costs of moral hazard onto the policyholder rather than the in-
surer.124 However, this makes little sense from an insurance 
economics perspective: to the extent that moral hazard cannot 
be ameliorated by an exclusion because consumers do not have 
purchaser information about the exclusion, then it is the insur-
er, rather than the policyholder, that should bear this risk. This 
is because the insurer can at least spread the moral hazard risk 
among policyholders, and thus eliminate the risk, if not the 
cost, of moral hazard. 
 
 121. See Peter Molk, Playing with Fire: Testing Moral Hazard in Home-
owners Insurance, 2018 UTAH L. REV (forthcoming 2018). 
 122. See id. at 19 (“[P]olicyholder understanding of insurance agreements 
is notoriously poor.”). 
 123. See Schwarcz, supra note 66, at 1268. 
 124. See Schwarcz, supra note 7, at 425. 
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For example, suppose that a homeowners insurance policy 
excludes losses for vandalism and malicious mischief that oc-
curs while the home is vacant.125 One purpose of this exclusion 
might be to counteract the prospect that insured individuals 
will not take prudent precautions when they leave their home 
vacant, such as having a neighbor check on the home periodi-
cally and maintaining the appearance that the home is occu-
pied. By excluding coverage for vacant homes altogether, the 
insurer can counteract this moral hazard risk and induce poli-
cyholders to take appropriate levels of care. But in any individ-
ual case, this logic will only work if the policyholder is aware of 
the underlying exclusion. Otherwise, the policyholder’s level of 
care cannot be affected by the terms of coverage and, to the ex-
tent that she takes less care under the mistaken assumption 
that she is insured, this will continue to be true notwithstand-
ing the coverage exclusion. Because the insurer cannot directly 
detect when a policyholder may choose to leave her home va-
cant and send a specific warning at that time, the primary time 
when the insurer can communicate this exclusion is when the 
policyholder purchases coverage. If a policyholder fails to take 
prudent precautions in ignorance of the exclusion, the result is 
simply that the costs of moral hazard have been shifted on to 
that policyholder; the exclusion has done nothing to mitigate 
the moral hazard risk. 
In most cases this logic is complicated by the fact that pur-
chaser information varies among policyholders. In the example 
above, some homeowners might have sufficient purchaser in-
formation to anticipate the possibility of a coverage exclusion 
for vandalism while their home is vacant, while others may not. 
The net effect of the exclusion will therefore be to reduce moral 
hazard for some subset of policyholders, while simply shifting 
this risk of moral hazard on to the remaining policyholders.126 
Whether such a policy provision is ultimately sensible from a 
social welfare perspective would thus turn largely on the 
breadth of purchaser information across the policyholder popu-
lation. 
Purchaser information may also serve an important role in 
changing policyholder behavior in ways that are completely in-
dependent of moral hazard. First, policyholders’ purchaser in-
 
 125. See, e.g., Langill v. Vt. Mut. Ins. Co., 268 F.3d 46 (1st Cir. 2001). 
 126. See Schwarcz, supra note 66, at 1308 (“The exclusion simply shifts the 
moral hazard cost to policyholders without limiting it.”). 
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formation may conceivably impact their savings and invest-
ment strategies. For instance, a policyholder who understands 
that her deductible is the largest loss she might have to incur 
might make sure to have at least that amount in her savings 
account or available via a line of credit. The impact of purchas-
er information on savings and investment is more salient for 
life insurance policies, which often function more as an invest-
ment and savings vehicle rather than as a risk-protection vehi-
cle.127 Second, particularly in the health insurance context, pur-
chaser information can be vitally important to ensuring that 
policyholders access their benefits appropriately.128 For in-
stance, a policyholder who does not understand that her insur-
ance policy includes a limited network of providers may inad-
vertently seek care from an out-of-network provider and be 
liable for much greater expenses than anticipated. But even 
outside of health insurance, purchaser information can be use-
ful to helping policyholders access their coverage. To take one 
example, homeowners insurance policies often cover losses to 
food spoiled as a result of a power outage, but many policyhold-
ers who experience this event outside of the context of a broad-
er loss129 may never make a claim because they are unaware of 
the possibility of such coverage. 
*** 
Purchaser information thus serves a number of central 
goals in insurance markets. Importantly though, purchaser in-
formation need not always be highly specific in order for it to 
achieve its aims. For instance, so long as policyholders have 
broad awareness of the possibility that certain categories of 
losses might not be covered by their insurance policy, then poli-
cy exclusions geared towards moral hazard and adverse selec-
tion will generally tend to serve their purpose. This is because 
policyholders generally have the capacity to consult their in-
 
 127. See Susan Lorde Martin, Betting on the Lives of Strangers: Life Set-
tlements, STOLI, and Securitization, 13 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 173, 173 (2010) 
(“Over time, life insurance has become a much more sophisticated financial 
product incorporating savings plans, mutual fund investments, and securitiza-
tions.”). 
 128. See Schwarcz, supra note 7, at 407. 
 129. Policyholders that experience a broader loss often do not need to rely 
on purchaser information to take advantage of all of their policy’s benefits be-
cause they make a claim, which in turn triggers a process (often facilitated by 
an agent) that helps ensure that the policyholder recovers all of the benefits to 
which he is entitled.  
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surer or agent regarding the terms of their coverage if they 
pose unusual risks ex ante that may require supplemental cov-
erage (in the case of adverse selection), or if they are consider-
ing taking on new or non-standard risks ex post (in the case of 
moral hazard).130 Thus, a key feature of purchaser information 
in insurance is that it need only be specific enough to prompt 
particular types of policyholders, or policyholders considering 
certain types of activities, to consult their insurer or agent. For 
certain types of activities or risks—such as intentionally burn-
ing down one’s home or insuring a hovercraft—policyholders’ 
background assumptions regarding the nature of their insur-
ance coverage likely contain sufficient purchaser information to 
effectively combat moral hazard and adverse selection without 
respect to any information affirmatively conveyed by an insurer 
or its agent. 
B. RATIONALES FOR PROMOTING POLICY INFORMATION IN 
INSURANCE MARKETS 
Insurers obviously have many important reasons for speci-
fying their coverage obligations to policyholders in great detail 
in their insurance policies. Producing such policy information 
allows insurers to define the scope of their obligations to poli-
cyholders, which facilitates the accurate pricing of coverage, 
limits the risk of policyholder lawsuits, and promotes the effi-
cient resolution of claims. Insurance laws and regulations that 
limit the enforceability of policy language, and thus undermine 
policy information, can jeopardize these important benefits to 
insurers. 
But these policy information benefits to insurers do not 
(and cannot) explain the various laws and regulations can-
vassed in Part I that seek to affirmatively promote more specif-
ic and clear policy information. Aside from the background le-
gal rule that contracts are enforceable as written, insurers do 
not need the intervention of laws and regulations to supply pol-
icy information that meets their own contracting goals.131 Thus, 
 
 130. To be sure, some policyholders may be reluctant to ask these questions 
of their insurer because insurers will make negative inferences about the poli-
cyholder on this basis. But this possibility is ameliorated by the existence of 
independent insurance agents and brokers, who can provide policyholders 
with coverage information without the insurer being able to make any nega-
tive inferences about the inquiring policyholder. See Bruce L. Hay, Procedural 
Justice – Ex Ante vs. Ex Post, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1802, 1834–36 (1997). 
 131. See Eric A. Posner, Essay, The Parole Evidence Rule, the Plain Mean-
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insurance laws and regulations that affirmatively promote poli-
cy information beyond that which is supplied by insurers must 
be premised on the interests of non-insurer audiences, includ-
ing policyholders, market intermediaries, regulators, judges, 
and lawyers. As this Section shows, there are indeed a variety 
of potential benefits of clear and more specific policy infor-
mation to these varied actors in insurance marketplaces. 
1. Promoting More Efficient Insurance Policies 
Like purchaser information, more specific and clear policy 
information can help prompt insurers to draft more efficient in-
surance policies. This is true even in the vast majority of cases 
when policyholders do not read their insurance policies at the 
time of purchase.132 Policy information can accomplish this by 
facilitating the capacity of market intermediaries—including 
insurance agents and brokers, journalists, academics, and regu-
lators—to police the terms of insurance policies for unusual or 
unfairly one-sided terms.133 Such policing of insurance policies 
by market intermediaries can help steer quality-conscious cus-
tomers away from low-quality insurers through intermediaries’ 
overarching recommendations or by having a broader impact on 
insurers’ reputations.134 Importantly, the prospect of these 
market forces operating can discourage insurers from over-
reaching in their drafting of insurance policies in the first 
place.135 
As with purchaser information, enhanced policy infor-
mation is more likely to promote high-quality insurance policies 
in insurance markets characterized by policyholders who are 
 
ing Rule, and the Principles of Contractual Interpretation, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 
533, 533–34 (1998). 
 132. When policyholders do read their insurance policies at issuance, the 
policy information can promote market discipline and efficient insurance poli-
cy terms through the same mechanism as that described under purchaser in-
formation. See supra Part I.A. 
 133. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW: SOFTWARE CONTRACTS § 2.02 cmt. e (AM. 
LAW INST. 2009) (“Transferors will also be mindful of watchdog groups that 
can easily access the standard form and can spread the word about the use of 
unsavory terms.”); Ronald Chen & Jon Hanson, The Illusion of Law: The Legit-
imating Schemas of Modern Policy and Corporate Law, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1, 
53–54 (2004) (“Consumer-oriented groups, such as the Consumers Union, act 
as informers and watchdogs on behalf of consumers.”). 
 134. See Schwarcz, supra note 7, at 418. 
 135. Of course, the extent to which any of this occurs even when policy in-
formation is high depends on a number of factors, including the pervasiveness 
of market intermediaries and the quality consciousness of consumers. 
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advised by sophisticated market intermediaries. By contrast, it 
is much harder to gauge when and how well policy information 
can promote market discipline in insurance markets geared 
primarily towards individuals and small businesses. The an-
swer to this question may well depend on how accessible policy 
information is to market intermediaries, consumer watchdogs, 
and academics. If different carriers’ contracts cannot be easily 
accessed by these entities, then they also cannot be easily scru-
tinized. At least until recently, it was incredibly difficult for 
most potential market intermediaries and watchdogs to easily 
access competing carriers’ insurance policies.136 
2. Promoting More Effective Regulatory Form Review 
In addition to promoting more efficient insurance policies, 
policy information can play an important role in insurance 
markets by facilitating more effective form review of insurance 
policies by state regulators.137 As described in Part I, most in-
surance policies that are geared towards individual purchasers 
and small businesses must be reviewed and approved by state 
insurance regulators before they can be sold.138 Any changes to 
previously approved insurance policies must also be reviewed 
and approved.  
Regulators engaged in this process are supposed to assess 
whether proposed insurance contracts comply with various spe-
cific state requirements and prohibitions.139 Additionally, many 
state regulators have broad authority to determine whether 
filed contracts meet more general standards of fairness and 
clarity.140 In many ways, this process of regulatory form review 
 
 136. In recent years, states such as California have improved the ability of 
market intermediaries and watchdogs to compare personal lines policies by 
posting all of these policies online. See Schwarcz, supra note 7, at 412–13. 
 137. The Restatement of the Law of Liability Insurance recognizes this 
point in the context of explaining why the default rule should be that insurers 
should not be allowed to recoup defense costs when it defends under a reserva-
tion of rights due to a legal uncertainty, and it is subsequently determined 
that the insurer does not owe coverage. As the Restatement explains, “A de-
fault no-recoupment rule better informs insurance regulators of the coverage 
that the insurer intends to provide under the policy form, facilitating informed 
administrative review of insurers’ intent to seek recoupment, and, once the 
form permitting recoupment is approved, better informs insurance purchasers 
of the more limited defense coverage provided by the policy.” See RESTATE-
MENT OF LIAB. INS. § 21 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 1, 2016). 
 138. See infra Part I.B. 
 139. See Baker & Logue, supra note 19, at 402. 
 140. See id. at 398. 
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is meant to fill the role of market discipline, described above, 
which is often lacking or uncertain in insurance markets 
geared towards individuals and small businesses.141 Although 
many commentators are skeptical of the effectiveness of such 
form review, there is limited empirical evidence on point.142 
Irrespective of the quality of states’ form review, such regu-
lation is undoubtedly improved by clearer and more specific 
policy information. This is because such policy information al-
lows regulators to better understand, solely on the basis of the 
proposed policy forms insurers submit for approval, what cov-
erage insurers will actually provide to consumers.143 This, in 
turn, enhances regulators’ capacity to question whether such 
coverage is generally consistent with basic principles of insur-
ance economics and policyholders’ reasonable expectations of 
coverage, as well as the state’s more specific laws and regula-
tions.144 By contrast, insurance regulators confronted with in-
surance policies containing vague, unclear, or limited policy in-
formation cannot be expected to fully anticipate the potential 
coverage issues that might arise or how insurers would respond 
to those coverage issues. Indeed, many insurance regulators re-
viewing policy forms are not themselves lawyers, nor do they 
have the time or resources to extend their review of policy 
forms well beyond the submitted documentation.145 
 
 141. Only recently have commentators began to acknowledge that this pro-
cess of regulatory form review has important implications for courts’ process of 
interpreting and construing these policies. ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 
2, at 145 (noting various questions about the relationship between state form 
review and the role of courts in “regulating” insurance policies); see also Baker 
& Logue, supra note 19, at 402 (noting the fact that “terms used in insurance 
contracts are subject to the approval of a public regulator . . . has gone largely 
ignored in the insurance contract law literature, [but] has important implica-
tions for insurance law”). 
 142. TOM BAKER & KYLE D. LOGUE, INSURANCE LAW AND POLICY: CASES, 
MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS 46 (2003); Schwarcz, supra note 6, at 1424–26. 
 143. Baker and Logue hint at this point at various times, perhaps most 
clearly in their suggestion that a regulator may be unlikely to approve insur-
ance policy forms that explicitly attempt to contract around implied terms. See 
Baker & Logue, supra note 19, at 402–08. 
 144. To be sure, none of this is to suggest that policy information is the on-
ly or even the primary obstacle to effective regulatory form review. To the con-
trary, there are a number of additional relevant factors—including the possi-
bility of regulatory capture as well as the limitations in applicable state law 
and regulatory resources—that may well tend to reduce the effectiveness of 
form review. Unfortunately, “[n]o systematic empirical evidence exists on the 
effectiveness of state form regulation.” ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 2, 
at 145. 
 145. See sources cited in Schwarcz, supra note 6, at 1424–25. 
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To better appreciate how policy information can facilitate 
regulatory review, consider the question of whether an insurer 
should be able to recover in subrogation when a policyholder 
has not been fully compensated by the sum of her insurance re-
covery and settlement in a lawsuit. To make the issue a bit 
more concrete, suppose that a person incurs $100,000 in medi-
cal bills after being punched by a neighbor. Suppose further 
that $50,000 of this amount is covered by her health insurance, 
and she receives $25,000 from the tortfeasor in a settlement. 
Should the health insurer be permitted to claim the $25,000 
settlement on the basis of subrogation? Many insurance policies 
do not directly deal with this issue. The omission of any rele-
vant information on point in most insurance policies means 
that regulators reviewing insurance policy forms never con-
template the issue one way or the other—it is far too obscure 
for a non-lawyer regulator facing resource constraints to plau-
sibly identify and, on that basis, hold up review of a filed policy. 
Now suppose that courts routinely reject insurer efforts to 
claim first-dollar priority over settlement dollars when the in-
surance policy is silent on the issue. This, in turn, might well 
trigger some insurers to explicitly change their policy language 
to establish their entitlement to first-dollar subrogation, gener-
ating specific policy information on this issue. But before that 
altered language can be implemented in the marketplace, it 
must be filed and approved with the state regulator.146 The 
same regulator who would never have spotted the first-dollar 
subrogation issue when it was omitted from the insurance poli-
cy will now be squarely confronted with the issue as a result of 
the enhanced policy information on point. How the regulator 
responds, of course, will depend on the relevant state laws and 
extent to which the regulator has the resources and desire to 
push back against the filing insurer. But at the very least, in-
surance laws promoting policy information will have ensured 
that the issue will receive at least some regulatory review and 
consideration. 
3. Preventing Unfair Claims Handling 
Another important benefit of policy information is that it 
can empower policyholders to independently assess the legiti-
macy of an insurer’s claim denial, thereby mitigating the risk 
 
 146. See NAT’L ASS’N INS. COMM’RS, STATE INSURANCE REGULATION (2011), 
http://www.naic.org/documents/topics_white_paper_hist_ins_reg.pdf. 
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that an insurer will unreasonably delay or deny a claim.147 The 
risk of unfair claims behavior by insurers stems from the fact 
that insurance policies are aleatory contracts, meaning that the 
performance obligations of one party (the insurer) is entirely 
contingent upon the uncertain occurrence of a future event (a 
particular type of loss to the policyholder).148 Meanwhile, once a 
loss does occur—whether or not it is covered—it is “too late for 
the policyholder to take other meaningful steps to obtain the 
purchased protection.”149 These features of insurance policies 
can potentially incentivize insurers to unreasonably delay or 
deny claims notwithstanding their contractual obligation to 
provide coverage.150 Doing so directly enhances the profitability 
of the insurer, at least in the short term and potentially in the 
long term. For these reasons, a central concern of insurance 
law and regulation is to prevent and remedy unfair claims 
handling by insurers.151 
Policy information plays an under-appreciated role in lim-
iting this risk of unfair claims handling because it empowers 
policyholders—with the help of their insurance agents, family, 
or regulators—to independently assess insurers’ claims deter-
minations. When insurance contracts are ambiguous or incom-
plete regarding the precise character of an insurer’s coverage 
obligations, it is easy for the carrier—or, more to the point, an 
adjustor—to deny coverage.152 Most policyholders will not have 
any basis to decide whether the insurer acted reasonably, pre-
cisely because the policy language that the insurer invokes to 
justify its decision will be unclear or indecipherable, as in the 
Liberty Mutual advertisement discussed at the outset of this 
Article. 
By contrast, when the applicable insurance policy language 
is relatively clear and on point—in other words, when policy 
language is relatively robust—then policyholders can inde-
 
 147. See Boardman, supra note 3, at 1075. 
 148. Bob Works, Excusing Nonoccurrence of Insurance Policy Conditions in 
Order To Avoid Disproportionate Forfeiture: Claims-Made Formats as a Test 
Case, 5 CONN. INS. L.J. 505, 553–57 (1999). 
 149. See RESTATEMENT OF LIAB. INS. § 2 cmt. h (AM. LAW INST., Tentative 
Draft No. 1, 2016). 
 150. See FEINMAN, supra note 13; Schwartz & Wilde, supra note 94, at 
1394. 
 151. See ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 2; TOM BAKER & KYLE D. 
LOGUE, INSURANCE LAW AND POLICY: CASES, MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS (3d 
ed. 2013). 
 152. See ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 2, at 179. 
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pendently assess the appropriate treatment of their claims. 
Even if the policyholder is uncertain about the meaning of the 
policy language, she can seek the help of advisors such as in-
surance agents or regulators, who will generally be capable of 
applying clear and unambiguous policy language to a particular 
case, even if they are not willing to opine on a bona fide legal 
dispute.153 
To be sure, many policyholders will no doubt fail to hold in-
surers accountable for questionable coverage denials even when 
policy information is relatively clear. But improving the ability 
of aggrieved policyholders to independently, or with assistance, 
assess the reasonableness of insurers’ coverage decisions none-
theless tends to improve the reliability and promptness of in-
surers’ claims handling operations. This is for several reasons. 
First, virtually all states require insurers, in the case of claims 
denials or reservations of rights, to promptly provide a reason-
able and accurate explanation of the basis for their actions, 
which includes quotations of the relevant policy language.154 As 
a result, insurers routinely highlight relevant policy infor-
mation when they choose to deny a claim or reserve their right 
to do so in the future, even if that language is buried within a 
long and complicated insurance policy. Of course, this means 
little when ordinary people read this language as “blah, blah, 
blah” as in the Liberty Mutual advertisement. But when the 
relevant policy information is clear and on point, this require-
ment limits the capacity of an insurer to deny a clearly merito-
rious claim: it is one thing for an insurer to quote ambiguous or 
nebulous policy language to justify denying a claim, but it is 
 
 153. State insurance regulators often play an important role in resolving 
coverage disputes, at least when there is not an interpretive issue that they 
deem to raise “legal” rather than “regulatory” issues. See Schwarcz, supra note 
85, at 757–58 (2009). 
 154. See UNFAIR CLAIMS SETTLEMENT PRACTICES ACT § 4 (NAT. ASS’N. INS. 
COMM’RS 1997) (defining as unfair claims settlement practices “[m]aking 
claims payments to an insured or beneficiary without indicating the coverage 
under which each payment is being made” and “failing, in the case of claims 
denials or offers of compromise settlement to promptly provide a reasonable 
and accurate explanation of the basis for such actions”). Although the NAIC 
model regulation does not explicitly require insurers to quote the policy lan-
guage, most states require insurers to provide a reasonable explanation of the 
basis in the insurance policy for the denial. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-66-
206 (2015); COLO. REV. STAT. § 10-3-1104 (2015); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 626.9541 
(West 2012). Other states, such as Minnesota, explicitly require insurers to 
provide the language in the policy when denying a claim based on a specific 
policy provision. See MINN. STAT. § 72A.201, subdiv. 8 (2015). 
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quite another for it to justify denying a claim by quoting policy 
language that is either irrelevant or that unambiguously re-
quires coverage. To the extent that an insurer attempted this, 
policyholders and those advising them—such as agents, regula-
tors, friends, or lawyers—would be reasonably well situated to 
challenge the claims determination in court or with the state 
regulator. 
A second, and related, reason that insurers can generally 
be expected to pay claims promptly when the relevant policy 
language is relatively clear and on point is that many states al-
low aggrieved policyholders to receive extra-contractual dam-
ages when insurers violate their coverage obligations in bad 
faith.155 Bad faith is defined differently in different states, but it 
generally requires an insurer to knowingly or recklessly refuse 
to provide coverage when there is no reasonable argument for 
doing so.156 The power of this rule to discourage unreasonable 
behavior by insurers is clearly directly linked to the clarity of 
applicable policy information: to the extent that an insurance 
policy is clear that it provides coverage for a specific loss, any 
refusal by an insurer to promptly provide that coverage would 
presumptively constitute bad faith. 
Third, an insurer’s refusal to cover a claim notwithstand-
ing clear policy language requiring coverage could also prompt 
regulatory scrutiny under the relevant state’s unfair claims 
handling practices statutes. By contrast, regulators do not, and 
generally cannot, use unfair claims settlement statutes to re-
solve interpretive questions regarding the application of insur-
ance policies.157 When insurance policies contain limited policy 
information, then coverage disputes are much more likely to be 
classified by regulators as legal or interpretive disputes, and 
thus to avoid potential regulatory scrutiny. 
To illustrate the power of policy information to limit the 
risk of unfair claims handling, consider exclusions in some 
property insurance policies for losses “occurring . . . while the 
hazard is increased by any means within the control or 
knowledge of the insured.”158 Although such increase-of-hazard 
 
 155. John J. Aromando, The Surety’s Liability for “Bad Faith”: Claims for 
Extra-Contractual Damages by an Obligee Under the Payment Bond, 47 ME. L. 
REV. 389, 390 (1995). 
 156. See ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 2, at 91–92. 
 157. See Schwarcz, supra note 85, at 745–46. 
 158. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Bachmann, 285 U.S. 112, 114 
(1932). 
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clauses are designed to limit the risk of moral hazard, they 
provide limited policy information because they are vague and 
indeterminate. As a result, an insurer could conceivably invoke 
such a clause to exclude coverage in a wide variety of cases. For 
instance, an insurer might refuse to provide coverage to a 
homeowner whose house was damaged by a fallen tree limb, on 
the grounds that the tree became dangerously overgrown with 
the insured’s knowledge. A policyholder whose coverage was 
denied on this basis, and who was quoted the increase in haz-
ard clause, would face various barriers to challenging the in-
surer’s determination. Unless she consulted an informed law-
yer, she would have no way of knowing that courts interpret 
these clauses much more narrowly than did her insurer. 
In fact, however, increase-of-hazard clauses are rare, par-
ticularly in personal lines insurance policies, because courts are 
generally hostile to broad applications of these clauses.159 As a 
result, most property insurers, particularly in the personal 
lines arena, have moved away from excluding coverage for gen-
eralized negligence or insufficient care, and have instead 
sought to exclude coverage for specifically described risk-
increasing activities, such as freezing pipes while a home is left 
vacant. This results in increased policy information and de-
creased risk of unfair claims handling. Thus, an insurer using a 
standard ISO HO3 policy would simply have no credible basis 
in the policy to deny coverage to the homeowner whose over-
grown tree fell on his house. Because any attempt to do so 
would need to be backed up by specific policy language in the 
claims communication, and there is no clearly applicable lan-
guage on point, it is very unlikely that an insurer would at-
tempt to deny coverage in these circumstances. If it did, by at-
tempting to distort the policy language, it would likely trigger 
the scrutiny of certain policyholders, which would increase the 
risk of both enhanced regulatory inquiry and bad-faith litiga-
tion. 
4. Conserving Judicial Resources 
Another virtue of robust policy information in insurance is 
that it can conserve judicial resources by decreasing the fre-
quency of coverage suits and facilitating judgments without the 
 
 159. See D & S Realty, Inc. v. Markel Ins. Co., 789 N.W.2d 1, 11–13 (Neb. 
2010) (“[I]ncreased hazard conditions . . . are often so broad that an insured’s 
violation of them is not causally relevant to the loss.”). 
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need for extensive discovery or evidentiary hearings. Limited 
policy information will generally increase both the likelihood of 
coverage suits and the prospect that these suits will not be set-
tled by the parties. This is because limited policy information 
creates greater uncertainty about the appropriate outcome, 
opening up the inquiry to potentially include issues such as rel-
evant precedent and extrinsic evidence. Whenever uncertainty 
increases, parties are more likely to sue and less likely to set-
tle.160 
C. RATIONALES FOR PROMOTING JUDICIAL INFORMATION IN 
INSURANCE MARKETS 
Judicial information regarding the scope of insurers’ cover-
age obligations has multiple audiences, including market in-
termediaries, coverage attorneys, and insurers. As this Section 
makes clear, the potential benefits associated with developing 
this form of coverage information—which clarifies, supple-
ments and expands on the information embedded within insur-
ance policies—varies across these different audiences. For in-
surers, judicial information is a crucial tool for facilitating their 
control over the scope of their exposures. Meanwhile, coverage 
information helps streamline the claims-handling process and 
reduce the risk of protracted disputes, a benefit that accrues to 
insurers, policyholders, and the judicial system. 
1. Facilitating Insurers’ Control of Coverage and Limiting 
Correlated Risks to Insurers 
For insurers, the risk of unanticipated adverse coverage 
determinations can pose substantial challenges. Insurers are 
generally able to take on numerous individual risks that are 
uncorrelated, meaning that any one policyholder’s experience of 
a loss will not impact the probability that other policyholders 
will experience a loss. As a result of the law of large numbers, 
insurers can rest assured that policyholder losses in the aggre-
gate will tend to follow a stable and predictable pattern.161 But 
the binding/persuasive nature of legal precedent plus the com-
mon evolution of insurance policies means that a single adverse 
ruling in one case can have a dramatic impact on insurers’ cov-
 
 160. See Stephen McG Bundy, The Policy in Favor of Settlement in an Ad-
versary System, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 13–15 (1992). 
 161. See ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 2, at 4. 
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erage obligations for an entire subset of potential losses or poli-
cyholders. 
The likelihood that an individual case will generate corre-
lated losses of this type for insurers is directly proportionate to 
the amount of judicial information that exists with respect to a 
particular policy and type of loss. When a large amount of judi-
cial information exists regarding a particular policy type, then 
any individual adverse coverage decision is not likely to alter 
the aggregate legal landscape with respect to highly consequen-
tial issues. Most such issues will already be the subject of a 
large body of precedent that will not be substantially impacted 
by any single case. But even for long-standing policies, novel 
types of losses can re-introduce the prospect that an adverse 
coverage decision will produce large correlated losses. That risk 
decreases as judicial information on novel losses increases over 
time. The prospect that legal risk can produce correlated losses 
is particularly acute for long-tail insurance policies, such as 
where coverage is based on the date of an “occurrence” or loss 
rather than the time at which a claim is submitted to an insur-
er.162 In these cases, the correlated losses produced by adverse 
coverage decisions can only be partially limited by altering the 
relevant language in later insurance policies. 
Consider one recent illustration of these points involving 
cyber-insurance. Liability insurers attempt to avoid covering 
cyber-related liability in their general liability policies, princi-
pally for adverse selection reasons.163 But until recently, very 
little judicial information existed on the question of what cov-
erage a CGL policy might provide for cyber-risk, as this risk 
has only recently emerged as a major threat. As a result, some 
general liability insurers are now discovering that they inad-
vertently insured a number of different forms of cyber liability 
in their CGL policies. For instance, one recent case reasons 
that a firm’s inadvertent publishing of medical records consti-
tutes “publication” and thereby triggers coverage under the 
personal and advertising injury coverage of an older version of 
 
 162. See generally Ronen Avraham, The Economics of Insurance Law—A 
Primer, 19 CONN. INS. L.J. 29 (2012) (providing an introduction to insurance 
law and the economy). 
 163. In particular, companies vary tremendously in their susceptibility to 
cyber liability and the potential magnitude of such liability. Thus, insurers 
generally prefer to offer such coverage only in specialized insurance policies, 
which force policyholders to “reveal” their exposure, thus triggering enhanced 
underwriting by insurers. See Cybersecurity, NAT’L ASS’N INS. COMM’RS (Jan. 
25, 2016) http://www.naic.org/cipr_topics/topic_cyber_risk.htm. 
  
2017] COVERAGE INFORMATION 1501 
 
a CGL policy.164 Another recent case found potential coverage 
when a plaintiff alleged that a policyholder’s product caused his 
computer to “freeze up,” as this claim included an allegation of 
“property damage.”165 
If judicial information about CGL policies’ coverage of 
cyber liability had been robust at the time the insurer issued 
the policy, then insurers could have avoided this correlated loss 
by either pricing it into coverage or explicitly limiting coverage. 
But the lack of relevant judicial information at the time has re-
sulted in significant losses for CGL insurers: they are now be-
ing held liable for losses that they did not anticipate that they 
were covering when they issued those policies. Importantly, the 
nature of this miscalculation is significant because the expo-
sures are correlated: these cases effectively change the scope of 
coverage that CGL insurers provide to every single one of their 
policyholders.166 Moreover, because most CGL policies provide 
occurrence-based coverage, insurers’ capacity to respond to the-
se holdings by changing their coverage language is limited: 
notwithstanding any redrafting of new policies, insurers are 
still on the hook under their old policies for a subset of cyber li-
ability losses that are deemed to have occurred when those ear-
lier policies were in force. These dynamics tend to undermine 
well-functioning insurance markets by exposing insurers to po-
tentially large and correlated losses, thus increasing the cost of 
coverage as well as its cyclicality.167 
More generally, judicial information in insurance markets 
allows insurers to better control their coverage obligations, and 
 
 164. Travelers Indem. Co. of Am. v. Portal Healthcare Sols., L.L.C., No. 14-
1944, 2016 WL 1399517, at *2 (4th Cir. Apr. 11, 2016). 
 165. Eyeblaster, Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 613 F.3d 797, 799–800 (8th Cir. 
2010). 
 166. Scott E. Harrington & Patricia Danzon, The Economics of Liability 
Insurance, in HANDBOOK OF INSURANCE (Georges Dionne ed., 2000) (defining 
“socio-legal risk” as the possibility that changes in legal precedent will simul-
taneously impact multiple policies and potential claims). 
 167. Environmental liability insurance provides a historical example of 
how an insurance market can be disrupted by unanticipated uncertainty in 
judicial interpretation. The passage of the Federal Superfund Act in 1980 
(CERCLA), which imposed retroactive clean-up liability regardless of when 
the pollutants were deposited, combined with inconsistent and under-
developed judicial interpretations of the relevant insurance policy language, 
made it difficult for insurers to predict the frequency and severity of future 
claims. In turn, this resulted in insurers limiting the availability and level of 
coverage provided for environmental liability insurance. See Kenneth S. Abra-
ham, Environmental Liability and the Limits of Insurance, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 
942, 955–59 (1988). 
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thus to price that coverage competitively. This enhances the ef-
ficiency of insurance markets even apart from the issue of cor-
related losses, by allowing insurers to focus their underwriting 
and pricing of coverage on the risks they truly understand and 
intend to cover. For these reasons, both the ISO and individual 
insurers routinely update insurance policy forms in response to 
interpretive disputes.168 Thus, as judicial information has sug-
gested that traditional CGL policies might well cover certain 
forms of cyber liability, insurers have adjusted by redrafting 
their policies to clearly exclude such coverage.169 Although this 
does not address insurers’ exposures to occurrences that had 
already taken place prior to the policy change, over time it has 
allowed insurers to shed themselves of this exposure. As a re-
sult, insurers need not consider the cyber-risk exposures of 
businesses seeking CGL coverage unless these businesses also 
seek cyber-insurance policies.170 
2. Reducing the Cost and Risk of Resolving Claims Disputes 
A second virtue of judicial information for insurers is that 
it reduces the costs of administering claims by providing cer-
tainty regarding how different types of claims should be han-
dled. Over time, this allows insurers to forego using lawyers 
and other highly trained personnel to resolve claims. Instead, 
they can translate judicial information into clear guidelines to 
be applied by adjustors.171 Not only does this produce cost-
savings for the insurer, but it also decreases the time it takes to 
resolve claims, which directly benefits policyholders as well as 
insurers. 
Robust judicial information also reduces the risks of cover-
age litigation. Policyholders who are denied claims will tend to 
 
 168. See supra text accompanying notes 166–67. 
 169. Cybersecurity, supra note 163. 
 170. Id. 
 171. To be sure, there can often be gaps between the law as stated in judi-
cial opinions and the internal guidelines that individual firms generate to im-
plement the law. See H. LAURENCE ROSS, SETTLED OUT OF COURT: THE SOCIAL 
PROCESS OF INSURANCE CLAIMS 98–101 (1970) (describing how negligence law 
in the context of auto accidents was translated into a rule that in a rear-end 
collision, the driver in back loses); see also John Rappaport, How Private In-
surers Regulate Public Police (unpublished draft) (on file with author) (argu-
ing that liability insurance influences police behavior). See generally Tom 
Baker, Liability Insurance as Tort Regulation: Six Ways that Liability Insur-
ance Shapes Tort Law in Action, 12 CONN. INS. L.J. 1 (2005) (outlining how 
liability insurance has impacted tort law). 
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have much less basis for fighting a (correct) claims denial to the 
extent that there is robust judicial information on point validat-
ing the insurer’s coverage denial. And even when a particularly 
aggressive policyholder (or policyholder’s attorney) does fight a 
legitimate claim denial, the suit is more likely to be quickly 
dismissed or settled if the relevant judicial information was ro-
bust and consistent with the insurer’s initial determination. 
These benefits accrue not only to insurers, but also to policy-
holders and the court system more broadly. For policyholders, 
robust judicial information tends to reduce the risk associated 
with litigating a denied claim. And, reduced litigation over cov-
erage denials decreases the overall caseload for courts. 
*** 
Table 2, below, outlines both the primary intended audi-
ences of different types of coverage information as well as the 
various different types of benefits that can flow from such in-
formation. 
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Table 2: Benefits of Each Type of Coverage Infor-
mation 
 Purchaser In-formation: 
Policy Infor-
mation: 
Judicial In-
formation: 
Definition 
Information about 
the general terms 
of coverage that is 
communicated to 
policyholders at 
any point during 
the purchasing 
process. 
Information about 
the scope of cover-
age that is in the 
insurance policy. 
Information 
about the scope of 
coverage that is 
available only af-
ter sustained le-
gal research. 
Primary 
Audience(s) 
for Infor-
mation 
Purchaser during 
the purchasing 
process. 
(i) Regulators 
conducting form 
review; (ii) market 
intermediaries; 
(iii) courts; (iv) 
purchasers at 
time of denied 
claim; (v) coverage 
attorneys. 
(i) Insurers; (ii) 
market interme-
diaries; (iii) 
courts; (iv) cover-
age attorneys. 
Primary 
Benefits of 
Each Type 
of Coverage 
Information 
(i) Reduces moral 
hazard and im-
pacts ex post be-
havior more 
broadly; (ii) limits 
adverse selection 
and promotes 
matching of cover-
age with insurance 
needs; (iii) pro-
motes more effi-
cient policy terms. 
(i) Promotes effec-
tive regulatory 
form review; (ii) 
prevents unfair 
claims handling; 
(iii) conserves ju-
dicial resources; 
(iv) promotes 
more efficient pol-
icy terms. 
(i) Limits corre-
lated risks to in-
surers; (ii) reduc-
es cost of 
coverage litiga-
tion; (iii) pro-
motes efficient 
changes in cover-
age obligations. 
 
III.  CONFLICTS BETWEEN PURCHASER INFORMATION 
AND POLICY INFORMATION   
Appreciating the three types of coverage information that 
insurance law and regulation promote, and the distinct effi-
ciency benefits that can flow from each form of information, 
helps to illuminate the basic structure of insurance law and 
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regulation. But, the payoff of this framework is not just theoret-
ical. Instead, it also provides a helpful structure for analyzing 
many of the most important and controversial disputes in in-
surance law and regulation, which often implicate a tradeoff 
between different types of coverage information. 
This Part illustrates this point by applying the framework 
developed in Parts I and II to a number of long-standing con-
troversies in insurance law and regulation that pit purchaser 
information against policy information: (1) the use of extrinsic 
evidence to disambiguate policy language; (2) the “strong” rea-
sonable expectations doctrine; and (3) the design of rules gov-
erning insurance policy readability and disclosure.  
A. THE USE OF EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE TO DISAMBIGUATE POLICY 
LANGUAGE 
A common issue in insurance law involves the relationship 
between contra proferentem and the use of extrinsic evidence to 
resolve interpretive disputes. Most courts allow insurers to in-
troduce extrinsic evidence to help “disambiguate” otherwise 
ambiguous policy language.172 In doing so, these courts relegate 
the contra proferentem rule to a secondary status, holding that 
it applies only after the ordinary tools of contract interpreta-
tion, which include consideration of relevant extrinsic evidence, 
are exhausted.173 Other courts reject this approach, holding that 
the contra proferentem rule has special status in insurance law 
such that extrinsic evidence is not admissible to clarify ambig-
uous policy language.174 For these courts, contra proferentem 
applies immediately after all textual tools of interpretation are 
exhausted.175 
This doctrinal dispute involves a tradeoff between pur-
chaser information and policy information. A rule that allows 
insurers to introduce extrinsic evidence to disambiguate policy 
language generally prioritizes purchaser information over poli-
cy information. This is because it allows insurers or their 
agents to imbue the insurance policy with meaning through 
 
 172. See Stone Container Corp. v. Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection & Ins. 
Co., 165 F.3d 1157, 1161 (7th Cir. 1999). 
 173. Id. 
 174. See Wash. Nat’l Ins. Corp. v. Ruderman, 117 So. 3d 943, 949 (Fla. 
2013). Other courts may implicitly adopt this approach without clearly disclos-
ing this fact. See David S. Miller, Note, Insurance as Contract: The Argument 
for Abandoning the Ambiguity Doctrine, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1849, 1860 (1988). 
 175. Id. at 950. 
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sources that are external to the insurance policy itself, but that 
are conveyed to the policyholder prior to the time of purchase.176 
By contrast, a rule that prohibits the use of extrinsic evidence 
to disambiguate policy language prioritizes policy information 
over purchaser information by insisting that relevant coverage 
information be clearly contained in the policy, and thus creat-
ing incentives for insurers to draft or redraft their policies with 
this principle in mind. 
Although the framework developed in this Article cannot 
definitively resolve this complex insurance law issue, it pro-
vides new support for the position that extrinsic evidence 
should be inadmissible to disambiguate insurance policy lan-
guage, at least for individual policyholders.177 To see why, recall 
from Part II that many of the benefits of policy information are 
distinct from the benefits of purchaser information, including 
(1) facilitating form review by regulators and (2) limiting the 
risk of unfair claims handling.178 These benefits of policy infor-
mation are particularly important for individual policyholders. 
By contrast, policy information almost certainly does not pro-
vide purchaser information for ordinary consumers, who only 
understand basic key features of their coverage at the time of 
purchase and do not read their insurance policies at this 
time.179 
Allowing ambiguous policy language to be disambiguated 
by extrinsic evidence—even if that evidence was known (or 
should have been known) to the policyholder prior to pur-
chase—would undermine these two potential benefits of contra 
 
 176. Insurers can generally only admit such extrinsic evidence if the poli-
cyholder knew, or should have known, of that evidence at the time she agreed 
to the policy. See RESTATEMENT OF LIAB. INS. § 3 cmt. f (AM. LAW INST., Pro-
posed Official Draft 2016). 
 177. For many of the same reasons as those canvassed in Part II.A, the 
analysis differs for sophisticated policyholders, or at least for policies that are 
predominantly sold to such policyholders. In such cases, the framework devel-
oped in this Article might suggest that extrinsic evidence should be admissible 
to disambiguate policy language, as such evidence helps the court better di-
vine the parties’ presumptive ex ante preferences, which is more important 
than ensuring accurate policy information when it comes to markets typified 
by sophisticated policyholders. Indeed, it may well be that courts should con-
sider such information even if it was not readily available to the particular 
policyholder at the time of purchase, at least to the extent that this infor-
mation helped establish the insurance-based rationale for the insurer’s pro-
posed interpretation. 
 178. See supra Part II.A. 
 179. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
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proferentem. First, this rule would tend to undermine the ca-
pacity of policy information to limit unfair claims handling. 
This is because relevant extrinsic evidence—such as an agent’s 
oral statement regarding coverage or an insurer’s marketing 
materials—is generally provided to policyholders prior to or at 
the time of purchase.180 But coverage information is only capa-
ble of preventing unfair claims practices if it is reasonably 
available to the policyholder, or her advisor, at the time when 
the claim is actually delayed or denied, which may be months 
or (more likely) years after the policy is purchased. A policy-
holder who has just been denied coverage may well fail to re-
member conversations or marketing material reviewed years 
earlier when she purchased her policy. Nor would such extrin-
sic evidence be known to anyone advising a policyholder whose 
claim had just been denied, such as a family member or lawyer. 
Extrinsic evidence conveyed to the policyholder prior to pur-
chase would thus end up doing little to limit insurers’ capacity 
to unreasonably deny claims because it does not promote the 
availability of coverage information at the relevant time—when 
a policyholder’s claim has been delayed or denied. 
Second, most forms of extrinsic evidence made available to 
the policyholder at the time of purchase would do little to help 
facilitate regulators’ or market intermediaries’ review and as-
sessment of the coverage provided by different carriers. The 
reason is simple: most forms of extrinsic evidence relevant to a 
specific insurance policy’s interpretation are not visible to mar-
ket intermediaries and insurance regulators. These parties ob-
viously do not hear what individual insurance agents say, nor 
do they typically review specific marketing materials or policy 
brochures in the context of examining competing insurers’ poli-
cy forms. By contrast, a penalty default approach that incentiv-
izes insurers to spell out their understanding of specific cover-
age issues in the policy itself would allow regulators to look in a 
single place to review and analyze competing insurers’ coverage 
obligations.181 
 
 180. See RESTATEMENT OF LIAB. INS. § 3 cmt. f (AM. LAW INST., Tentative 
Draft No. 1, 2016) (“Because the objective of using the extrinsic evidence is to 
understand the meaning that a reasonable person in this policyholder’s posi-
tion would ascribe to the term, such evidence may only be used against an in-
sured when the policyholder could reasonably be expected to have been aware 
of it.”). 
 181. Many of these points may also apply to the capacity of policy infor-
mation to promote market discipline through market intermediaries. Some 
market intermediaries—particularly those that are not embedded within the 
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Meanwhile, it is unlikely that limiting the admissibility of 
relevant extrinsic evidence to disambiguate policy language 
would substantially undermine insurers’ interests. Extrinsic 
evidence that was known or should have been known by the 
policyholder at the time of purchase constitutes purchaser in-
formation. As explored in Part II, purchaser information can 
serve a number of important roles in insurance markets, in-
cluding reducing adverse selection and moral hazard.182 But 
forbidding insurers from introducing such evidence to disam-
biguate policy language is unlikely to meaningfully interfere 
with their capacity to efficiently impact policyholders’ levels of 
care or purchase of supplemental coverage. The reason is sim-
ple: the vast majority of ordinary policyholders obviously have 
no clue at the time of purchase whether extrinsic evidence con-
veyed to them by their agent or insurer would be admissible in 
a later coverage dispute. Thus, the applicable rule cannot im-
pact those policyholders’ incentives to take care or their will-
ingness to “reveal” their high-risk status. 
Consider an example to help concretize these arguments. 
In Washington National Insurance Corp. v. Ruderman, the 
primary issue before the court was the appropriate scope of an 
automatic benefit increase provision in a Home Healthcare In-
surance policy.183 According to the insurer, this automatic bene-
fit increase applied only to the policy’s daily limit amount, but 
not to its per occurrence limit or lifetime limit.184 By contrast, 
the policyholder argued that the automatic benefit term applied 
to all three limits within the policy.185 The court found that the 
insurance policy itself was ambiguous as both readings of its 
language were plausible.186 It then confronted the question of 
whether the insurer could support its preferred interpretation 
by introducing into evidence marketing material that was used 
to sell the policy in support of its preferred interpretation.187 
The court ruled that the insurer was barred from admitting 
this extrinsic evidence to disambiguate the policy.188 
 
industry, such as academics or consumer-oriented magazines—also may not 
have extrinsic evidence available to them when they examine competing in-
surers’ policy forms. 
 182. See supra Part II. 
 183. 117 So. 3d 943, 943 (Fla. 2013). 
 184. Id. at 946. 
 185. Id. at 946–47. 
 186. Id. at 949. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. 
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The reasoning above helps justify the Ruderman court’s 
holding, and suggests that it should be embraced by more ju-
risdictions. First, it illustrates how allowing extrinsic evidence 
to disambiguate policy language can undermine a core benefit 
of policy information: promoting effective regulatory form re-
view.189 In particular, recognize that the Florida Insurance De-
partment, on reviewing and approving the Home Healthcare 
Insurance Policy at issue in the case, did not review the mar-
keting material used to sell the policy in conjunction with its 
form approval process.190 It thus may well have believed that 
the automatic benefit increase term did indeed apply to all lim-
its in the policy. Had the policy unambiguously stated that the 
automatic benefit increase provision applied only to the daily 
limit, but not the per occurrence and lifetime limits, the de-
partment might reasonably have questioned the rationale for 
this scheme: an automatic benefit increase provision such as 
that in the policy protects against medical inflation, which im-
pacts the daily limit in the same way as it impacts the per-
occurrence and lifetime limits in the policy. A policy structure 
that only adjusts the daily limit, but not the per occurrence and 
lifetime limits, is thus seemingly incoherent. 
Ruderman also illustrates how permitting extrinsic evi-
dence to disambiguate policy language can undermine a second 
core benefit of policy information: preventing unfair claims 
handling. Recall that policy information can accomplish this by 
empowering policyholders and those advising them to use con-
tract language to reliably distinguish between legitimate and 
illegitimate claims determinations.191 Admitting extrinsic evi-
dence to clarify the meaning of contract language only advances 
this goal if that evidence is cognitively and physically available 
to policyholders and their representatives at the time that the 
insurer denies a claim. But this was not the case in Ruderman, 
where the policyholders likely saw any marketing relevant to 
the meaning of the automatic benefit increase provision years 
before any question arose about its applicability to per occur-
rence and lifetime limits. Policyholders would almost certainly 
not have recalled this portion of the marketing material years 
later, when their coverage was limited. And even if the policy-
 
 189. See supra Part II.B.2. 
 190. The process of form review is generally independent of regulators’ re-
view of insurers’ marketing material, which is not typically subject to any re-
gime of prior approval. See ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 2. 
 191. See supra Part II.B.3. 
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holder had retained this marketing material—a possibility that 
seems increasingly unlikely as time passes—she would not 
generally look to these materials to scrutinize a claim, as the 
insurer itself focuses on the policy language in its explanation 
of its coverage denial. Allowing insurers like the defendant in 
Ruderman to invoke this type of evidence to justify their pre-
ferred reading of their policies would thus fail to empower poli-
cyholders and their representatives to accurately assess carri-
ers’ coverage obligations at the time a claim is denied. And this, 
of course, would tend to increase the risk of unfair claims han-
dling.192 
Once again, the claim here is not that there are no legiti-
mate arguments for allowing extrinsic evidence to disambigu-
ate policy language for ordinary consumers. For instance, a 
critic might contend that this approach would tend to increase 
coverage litigation as policyholders found new ways to argue 
that policy language that everyone understood to mean one 
thing actually could be read to mean something else. Instead, 
the goal of this Section is merely to bring a new perspective on 
how the use of extrinsic evidence in disambiguating policy lan-
guage may affect consumers by negatively impacting regulatory 
form review and by increasing the risk of unfair claims han-
dling. 
B. POLICYHOLDERS’ REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS OF COVERAGE 
A perennial issue in insurance law is the desirability of a 
“strong” form of the reasonable expectations doctrine, which al-
lows courts to refuse to honor unambiguous policy language 
when doing so would undermine policyholders’ reasonable ex-
pectations of coverage.193 As described in Part I, one important 
justification for this doctrine is that it can promote purchaser 
information, either directly (by supplying coverage consistent 
with purchaser information) or indirectly (by inducing insurers 
to supply better purchaser information).194 Meanwhile, many 
critics of the strong form of the reasonable expectations doc-
 
 192. Id. 
 193. Consistent with the analysis in Part III.A, the doctrine does not apply 
to sophisticated policyholders. RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF 
INSURANCE LAW, supra note 19, at 395 (“[T]hose (few) courts that apply the 
strong form of the doctrine of reasonable expectations have done so only in sit-
uations which the contracts are standard form personal or small business poli-
cies, which correlates with unsophisticated policyholders.”).  
 194. See supra Part I.A. 
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trine tend to emphasize insurers’ substantial interests in the 
reliability of policy information, which the rule tends to under-
mine.195 
Once again, the framework developed in this Article can 
help clarify, though not resolve, some of the key issues that are 
implicated in this debate. For instance, the coverage infor-
mation framework suggests one important subset of cases 
where the argument for a strong reasonable expectations doc-
trine is at its zenith. To appreciate how, recall the point, devel-
oped in Part II, that purchaser information can be particularly 
important in insurance because it is necessary for an insurance 
policy to effectively combat moral hazard and adverse selec-
tion.196 Recall also that purchaser information need not be high-
ly specific to achieve these goals; it merely needs to put policy-
holders “on notice” that there might be an exclusion in their 
policy, at which point they can ask their insurer or agent about 
the precise scope of coverage.197 In some cases, further inquiry 
will be triggered simply by background assumptions among or-
dinary policyholders regarding the types of losses that insurers 
do and do not cover. 
All of this suggests that the case for a strong form of the 
reasonable expectations doctrine is particularly compelling 
when the policyholder did not have adequate warning—based 
on the insurer’s marketing materials, agent’s statements, or 
simply common sense—about policy exclusions that are de-
signed to combat moral hazard or adverse selection. For in-
stance, consider the well-known case of Atwood v. Hartford, 
which involved the application of a completed operations exclu-
sion in a general liability policy that limited coverage for liabil-
ity resulting from harms occurring after the insured’s opera-
tions were completed.198 The policyholder in the case was an 
 
 195. As noted in Part II.B, the benefits of policy language to insurers oper-
ates as a key rationale for rejecting rules of insurance law and regulation that 
would undermine policy information, even if it does not also operate as an in-
dependent rationale for promoting such information. 
 196. See supra Part II.A.3. Purchaser information is also important to en-
sure that suitable insurance policies are sold to individuals, such that their 
basic risks are covered. This issue, however, is already regulated to some de-
gree by suitability laws for some life insurance products and by the profes-
sional obligations of agents to provide competent advice. Whether or not these 
are sufficient, it seems that the strong form of the reasonable expectations 
doctrine would not be the most efficient way to deal with this issue. 
 197. See supra Part II.A.3. 
 198. Atwood v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 365 A.2d 744 (N.H. 1976). 
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electrician who was sued because his alleged failure to properly 
fix a thermostat resulted in a baby dying of heat prostration.199 
The most plausible explanation for this exclusion is that it 
helped the insurer address adverse selection, by forcing policy-
holders whose work posed risks even after that work was com-
pleted to purchase a completed operations endorsement of cov-
erage. But because the policyholder did not have even a 
generalized sense of this type of exclusion at the time he se-
cured coverage, the exclusion could not achieve its goal of forc-
ing the policyholder to purchase supplemental coverage.200 
Thus, one way of appreciating the Atwood decision is that the 
court used the reasonable expectations doctrine to target an in-
surer’s failed attempt to induce the policyholder to indirectly 
reveal his high-risk status, which was itself caused by the ap-
parent lack of purchaser information regarding the exclusion. 
One feature of this approach is that it suggests that policy-
holders wishing to invoke the strong form of the reasonable ex-
pectations doctrine could reasonably be required to show det-
rimental reliance as a result of their incorrect purchaser 
information.201 In the case of an adverse selection based exclu-
sion, such as that at issue in Atwood, such reliance would ordi-
narily consist of the policyholder unknowingly forgoing sup-
plemental coverage that was available on the marketplace at 
the time of purchase. Alternatively, in the case of an exclusion 
principally aimed at moral hazard, the detrimental reliance 
would presumably consist of the policyholder taking limited 
amounts of care under the mistaken belief that she was covered 
for the underlying loss by her insurance. In the absence of the-
se forms of reliance, there would be no direct harm to the con-
sumer that resulted from the lack of purchaser information, 
and thus more limited reason to undermine the insurer’s inter-
est in policy information. 
None of this, of course, resolves the larger debate about the 
desirability of the strong form of the reasonable expectations 
doctrine, which implicates a host of issues aside from coverage 
information ranging from the efficiency of insurance markets to 
the relative institutional capacities of judges and regulators. 
 
 199. Id. at 745. 
 200. Id. at 747. 
 201. See Abraham, supra note 35, at 1192 n.133 (“[I]n many cases in which 
the insurer appears to have created a misleading impression, reliance by the 
insured properly may be presumed; requiring proof of specific reliance might 
deny recovery in cases where there has been real injury.”). 
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But appreciating some of the key benefits of purchaser infor-
mation in the insurance context provides new insight on a 
seemingly tired debate in insurance law. 
Similar logic can also help illuminate insurance regulators’ 
use of their authority to review and approve insurance policy 
forms. As described in Part II, one potential goal of policy form 
review is to ensure that insurance policies provide coverage 
that is consistent with policyholders’ reasonable expectations.202 
Implementing this goal is hardly straightforward, however, for 
many of the same reasons that the reasonable expectations doc-
trine often proves difficult for courts to apply: the vast majority 
of individual policyholders have such a nebulous and ill-defined 
sense of what their policy covers that attempting to define in-
surers’ coverage obligations by reference to those expectations 
typically proves unworkable. 
The distinctive value of insurance purchaser information 
offers one solution to this problem. In particular, it suggests 
that regulators conducting form review should focus on exclu-
sions that involve moral hazard and adverse selection concerns 
to ensure that the exclusions involve activities that would nor-
mally prompt a person to check on his or her coverage. Under 
this approach, for instance, a regulator might refuse to permit 
an exclusion in a homeowners insurance policy for liability 
stemming from the knowing illegal consumption of alcohol—an 
uncommon exclusion, but one that is contained in at least some 
major insurers’ policies.203 The reason is that this exclusion is 
primarily aimed at limiting moral hazard—serving alcohol to 
an underage person—but it involves behavior that is quite 
common and that many people engage in without any thought 
as to the potential insurance implications of their actions.204 
 
 202. See supra Part II.B.2; Kenneth S. Abraham, The Expectations Princi-
ple as a Regulative Ideal, 5 CONN. INS. L.J. 59, 63–64 (1998). 
 203. See Schwarcz, supra note 9, at 1301 fig.21; see also, e.g., Van Zutphen 
v. Schemenauer, 445 N.W.2d 59 (Wis. Ct. App. 1989) (examining a Wisconsin 
homeowners policy containing a similar exclusion); AM. FAMILY MUT. INS. CO., 
NEVADA HOMEOWNERS POLICY BASIC FORM 1, at 10 http://doi.nv.gov/ 
uploadedFiles/doinvgov/_public-documents/Consumers/Home/American_ 
Family/16984a.pdf (“We will not cover bodily injury or property damage aris-
ing out of the insured’s knowingly permitting or failing to take action to pre-
vent the illegal consumption of alcohol beverages by an underage person.”). 
 204. See, e.g., NAT’L CTR. ON ADDICTION AND SUBSTANCE ABUSE (CASA) AT 
COLUMBIA UNIV., NATIONAL SURVEY OF AMERICAN ATTITUDES ON SUBSTANCE 
ABUSE XI: TEENS AND PARENTS ii (2006) (reporting that nearly half of all sev-
enteen-year-olds have attended house parties where parents are present and 
teens are drinking or taking drugs). 
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C. INSURANCE DISCLOSURES, PLAIN LANGUAGE, AND POLICY 
SIMPLIFICATION 
As described in Part I, various insurance laws and regula-
tions aim to promote consumers’ ability to read and understand 
their insurance policies. For instance, the “weak” version of the 
reasonable expectations doctrine may discourage insurers from 
using unduly complex policy language.205 To similar effect are 
state regulations requiring insurance policies to meet quantita-
tive readability measures, to include tables of contents, and to 
comply with certain formatting rules.206 By contrast, insurance 
regulations frequently do not require insurers to provide poli-
cyholders with any disclosures regarding the scope of coverage 
that are independent of the insurance policies themselves.207 
This Article helps clarify that this regulatory approach 
fails to adequately distinguish between the benefits of purchas-
er information and the benefits of policy information. As em-
phasized in Part II, purchaser information and policy infor-
mation often provide very different benefits in insurance 
markets.208 For this reason, the rules governing the information 
that should be provided to consumers at the time of purchase 
and the information that is contained in the insurance policy 
itself can, and should, be quite different. On one hand, laws 
and regulations designed to promote policy simplification can, if 
effective, meaningfully improve policy information. By making 
policy language more accessible to laypersons, these rules can 
facilitate the ability of policyholders and their representatives 
to independently assess an insurer’s coverage determination 
and promote more effective regulatory form review.  
But these benefits of enhanced policy information are un-
likely to improve purchaser information or generate the associ-
ated benefits of such information, such as reduced moral haz-
ard, reduced adverse selection, and improved insurance policy 
quality. To meaningfully promote purchase information, policy 
simplification and readability rules would have to eviscerate 
policy information in the process. As discussed above, the vast 
majority of policyholders simply do not read their insurance 
policies for a variety of reasons, including their length and the 
fact that these policies are only provided to consumers at the 
 
 205. See supra text accompanying note 70.  
 206. See supra text accompanying notes 71–75. 
 207. Schwarcz, supra note 7, at 397. 
 208. See supra Part II.C.2, Table 2. 
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end of the purchasing process.209 Although designing rules to 
promote policyholder reading at the time of purchase is notori-
ously difficult, at least one key to any such initiative would be 
to shorten that document to one or two pages at the most.210 But 
reducing the insurance policy itself to anything close to this 
length would ultimately undermine specific and clear policy in-
formation, which often requires a great deal of detail as a result 
of the varied scenarios in which losses occur.211 
All of this suggests that states should consider developing, 
in parallel with readability rules applicable to insurance poli-
cies, mandatory disclosures that are independent of insurance 
policies and are specifically designed to promote the most rele-
vant forms of purchaser information. This approach would em-
brace the need for different regulatory regimes for purchaser 
information and policy information. To be sure, mandatory dis-
closures are often ineffective, and some have expressed skepti-
cism of virtually any form of disclosure-based regulation.212 But 
designing even moderately effective disclosures geared towards 
promoting purchaser information is hardly an insurmountable 
goal, particularly since the basic content of these disclosures 
would not undermine insurers’ interests.213 Such a disclosure 
could be developed based on emerging best practices in the de-
sign of consumer disclosures that the Consumer Financial Pro-
tection Bureau has developed in recent years.214 These under-
score the importance of integrated and simplified documents 
that are consumer tested, provided to consumers before they 
emotionally commit to making a purchase, and emphasize only 
the most important pieces of information. 
This Article’s framework suggests that this type of disclo-
sure should include at least three basic types of purchaser in-
 
 209. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
 210. See NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS (NAIC), BEST PRACTICES AND 
GUIDELINES FOR CONSUMER INFORMATION DISCLOSURES 3 (2012), http://www 
.naic.org/documents/committees_b_senior_issues_141218_birnbaum_cd_bp.pdf 
(“If a disclosure includes more than a few pieces of information, then that dis-
closure typically will be ineffective.”). 
 211. See supra note 49 and accompanying text. 
 212. OMRI BEN-SHAHAR & CARL E. SCHNEIDER, MORE THAN YOU WANTED 
TO KNOW: THE FAILURE OF MANDATED DISCLOSURE 144–46 (2014). 
 213. Cf. id. (emphasizing that one important barrier to effective disclosure 
is that firms or salespeople may have an incentive to undermine the disclo-
sure). 
 214. See Leonard J. Kennedy, Patricia A. McCoy, & Ethan Bernstein, The 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Financial Regulation for the Twenty-
First Century, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1141, 1159–60 (2012). 
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formation. First, it should include information regarding rela-
tive product quality, such as a numerical indication of how 
much an insurer’s policy differs from the industry-standard In-
surance Services Office form policy.215 Such information could 
enhance the capacity of purchaser information to promote more 
efficient policies. Second, it should notify policyholders of ex-
cluded risks that could be covered through the purchase of sup-
plemental coverage, thus facilitating insurers’ efforts to use 
coverage variation to address adverse selection.216 Third, it 
might include a generalized warning that certain risk-
enhancing activities or behaviors over which policyholders ex-
ercise control could undermine coverage, with an illustrative 
list of such activities drawn from the policy itself and a warning 
to call one’s agent if contemplating engaging in similar activi-
ties.217 
IV.  CONFLICTS BETWEEN POLICY INFORMATION AND 
JUDICIAL INFORMATION   
Conflicts between policy information and judicial infor-
mation are not as easy to spot as conflicts between purchaser 
information and policy information. But this Part suggests that 
the tension between policy information and judicial information 
is reflected in the largely overlooked relationship between two 
of the core sets of rules in insurance law: the ambiguity rule, on 
the one hand, and more specific insurance default rules, on the 
other. 
Section A of this Part explains this relationship between 
the ambiguity rule and more specific default rules in insurance 
law. In short, these two sets of rules often operate as alterna-
tives to resolving coverage disputes. Courts that (implicitly) se-
lect the ambiguity rule rather than a more specific insurance 
default rule tend to promote policy information for the familiar 
reason that doing so incentivizes insurers to draft their policies 
more clearly. But in the process, these courts sacrifice judicial 
information by failing to develop more specific default rules 
that can play an important role in insurance law. By contrast, 
courts that (implicitly) apply specific default rules to resolve 
coverage disputes rather than the blunter ambiguity rule sacri-
fice policy information at the same time that they promote judi-
 
 215. See supra Part II.A.1.  
 216. See supra Part II.A.2.  
 217. See supra Part II.A.3. 
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cial information. This is because they effectively allow insur-
ance policies to incorporate a series of terms, derived from case 
law, that are not contained in the policy itself and that insurers 
need not incorporate into the policy in the future. 
After exploring these points in more detail, Section B ap-
plies the coverage information framework to an important doc-
trinal dispute involving the ambiguity rule and more specific 
default rules: whether there should be a sophisticated policy-
holder exception to the ambiguity rule. Section B shows how 
this Article’s framework can generate novel arguments in favor 
of such an exception. 
A. CONTRA PROFERENTEM PROMOTES POLICY INFORMATION 
WHILE MORE SPECIFIC DEFAULT RULES PROMOTE JUDICIAL 
INFORMATION 
A substantial number of coverage disputes implicate in-
surance policy language that is silent or unclear about how the 
policy applies to the particular loss at issue, as well as similar 
fact patterns. Broadly speaking, there are two approaches that 
insurance law uses to resolve these cases. First, and more 
straightforwardly, courts can hold that the policy is ambiguous 
and hence that the policyholder prevails. Second, courts can 
develop—based on precedent, the presumed ex ante preferences 
of the parties, or a variety of other considerations—more specif-
ic rules that effectively supplement the terms of the written in-
surance policy. 
Consider a simple example. Numerous property coverage 
disputes turn on the meaning of the word “caused,” as property 
insurance policies often only cover losses caused by certain per-
ils. Yet many insurance policies do not define this term, or else 
define it in one section but not another. Courts confronting cov-
erage disputes where the causal link between a peril and a loss 
is unclear can adopt two basic approaches. First, they can simp-
ly rule for the policyholder on the basis of contra proferentem. 
Second, they can invoke a rule to fill in the meaning of 
“caused.” In fact, most courts uncritically adopt the latter ap-
proach, relying on precedent to define causation using the “effi-
cient proximate cause rule,” which treats a peril as causing a 
loss only if it was the dominant or primary cause of that loss.218  
 
 218. See Knutsen, supra note 16. To understand the implications of this 
approach, consider a policyholder whose home is damaged simultaneously by 
wind and water during a hurricane. Further assume that his homeowners in-
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Although all cases resolving coverage disputes create judi-
cial information, cases that rely on and develop specific gap-
filling rules create more judicial information than cases that re-
ly on contra proferentem. This is because specific default rules 
generally include information about how and when they apply 
to different types of coverage disputes. Perhaps even more im-
portantly, the meaning and appropriate application of these 
specific default rules develops over time, as they are applied in 
subsequent cases. For instance, the eight corners rule for the 
duty to defend makes it clear that an insurer has a duty to de-
fend whenever any claim in the complaint would, if true, be 
covered by any language in the policy.219 As the doctrine has 
evolved, various uncertainties about its application—such as 
when the duty to defend can be terminated, or how information 
known to the insurer but not included in the complaint impacts 
the analysis—have been resolved, thus further developing the 
scope and specificity of the rule.220 
By contrast, the ambiguity rule tends to create more lim-
ited judicial information than specific default rules.221 Most im-
portantly, this is because the scope of court decisions resolving 
a coverage case based on the ambiguity rule is quite often un-
clear. In such cases, the court determines that there are two 
reasonable interpretations of the relevant policy language as it 
applies to the particular claim under consideration. But such a 
holding inherently says little about whether the policy lan-
guage would be ambiguous as applied to a slightly different fact 
pattern. For instance, suppose that a court determined that a 
homeowners insurer had a duty to defend a policyholder ac-
 
surance covers losses “caused” by wind but not water. Ordinarily the policy-
holder would have a good argument that he is entitled to coverage for all his 
losses because his policy is ambiguous regarding its application to dual-cause 
losses. But as a result of the efficient proximate cause rule, the policyholder’s 
argument would almost certainly be unavailing, and the court would focus 
solely on the question of whether the wind or the water was the dominant 
cause of the loss. 
 219. See Robert P. Redemann & Michael F. Smith, 1 LAW AND PRACTICE OF 
INS. COVERAGE LITIG. § 4:15 (David L. Leitner et al. eds., 2015). 
 220. See, e.g., Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. Nokia, Inc., 268 S.W.3d 487, 497 (Tex. 
2008) (discussing various judicially created exceptions states follow when ana-
lyzing the eight corners rule). 
 221. This argument is consistent with, but in at least some tension with, 
Boardman’s claim that insurers are often reluctant to redraft contract terms 
even when those terms have been deemed ambiguous by courts, because doing 
so would actually reduce coverage information. See Boardman, supra note 62, 
at 1117–18. 
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cused of punching someone else, notwithstanding an intention-
al acts exclusion, because the underlying insurance policy was 
ambiguous about how the exclusion applied to a punch thrown 
in self-defense. That holding would preserve substantial uncer-
tainty about whether a liability insurer’s duty to defend would 
be triggered by other types of disputes, such as a scenario 
where the policyholder incorrectly perceived the need to act in 
self-defense. By contrast, a court that resolved this case by 
adopting a specific default rule that reasonable acts of self-
defense are not intentional conduct for purposes of an inten-
tional acts exclusion would provide substantially more infor-
mation about how this, and various other potential fact pat-
terns, should be resolved. 
Further limiting the judicial information created by the 
ambiguity rule is the fact that it is very hard to predict when a 
court will deem policy language to be ambiguous as applied to a 
particular claim. Ambiguity is a loose and subjective standard 
that is applied differently by different courts. Indeed, courts re-
ly on numerous different types of arguments to assess whether 
or not policy language is ambiguous. A non-exclusive list in-
cludes the apparent purpose of the contested language, the con-
tract language and structure surrounding the contested lan-
guage, the policy implications of finding the language 
ambiguous, the “ordinary” meaning of the contested language, 
policyholders’ reasonable expectations of coverage, whether the 
language could have been drafted more clearly by the insurer, 
and precedent finding the language ambiguous in similar con-
texts.222 Most courts are not forthright about the relative hier-
archy of these considerations in determining ambiguity. All this 
renders it extremely difficult to predict how a particular case 
finding policy language to be ambiguous may or may not be ap-
plied to different disputes. This, in turn, means that cases re-
solving coverage disputes via the ambiguity rule create limited 
amounts of judicial information.223 
The enhanced judicial information that specific default 
rules generate relative to the ambiguity rule is even clearer 
 
 222. Abraham, supra note 5, at 537. 
 223. The indeterminacy of judicial determinations regarding when lan-
guage is ambiguous extends well beyond the insurance domain. See, e.g., Brett 
M. Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2118, 2118 
(2016) (arguing that the trigger for a variety of central principles of statutory 
interpretation is “an initial determination of whether a text is clear or ambig-
uous,” but that “judges often cannot make that initial clarity versus ambiguity 
decision in a settled, principled, or evenhanded way”). 
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when specific default rules are crafted solely to reflect the par-
ties’ presumed ex ante preferences (thus constituting “majori-
tarian” default rules), rather than to penalize the drafting par-
ty (thus constituting “penalty” default rules).224 Majoritarian 
default rules promote judicial information in much the same 
way that state regulatory requirements for policy terms con-
sistent with policyholders’ reasonable expectations promote 
purchaser information: insurers’ coverage obligations are 
shaped by reference to the parties’ presumed ex ante expecta-
tions or assumptions. Not only does this increase the likelihood 
that parties’ expectations will be accurate, but it also makes it 
easier for insurers and other market actors to predict how case 
law might address future issues.225 
Although specific default rules provide more judicial in-
formation than the ambiguity rule, the ambiguity rule better 
promotes policy information than more specific default rules. 
Specific default rules tend to undermine policy information by 
effectively creating portions of the policy that exist in the case 
law, rather than in the policy itself.226 To be sure, in some cases, 
insurers incorporate into their policies judicially developed de-
fault rules. But in many other cases, insurers never do adopt 
this strategy, effectively relegating a large amount of coverage 
information to case law. Indeed, the hundreds of default rules 
contained in the evolving Restatement of Liability Insurance 
Project—touching on central issues ranging from the duty to 
defend, to the duty to settle, to the allocation of coverage across 
multiple triggered policies—suggest that this equilibrium char-
acterizes a substantial amount of liability insurance.227 
Specific default rules are particularly likely to undermine 
policy information when they are designed as majoritarian de-
 
 224. The majoritarian approach is similar to the “two islands” approach 
suggested by Ronen Avraham. See Avraham, supra note 162, at 29. 
 225. This is because insurance contracts of all types are presumptively con-
cerned with managing a small handful of well-known insurance problems, 
such as moral hazard, adverse selection, correlated risks, and promoting easy-
to-apply coverage rules. See Mark A. Geistfeld, Interpreting the Rules of Insur-
ance Contract Interpretation, 68 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 371, 384–90 (2015). 
 226. To be sure, this point applies to contract law in general: for instance, 
one reason that parties may not include extensive damages-related provisions 
in their contracts is because the default rule of expectation damages suits both 
parties reasonably well. But the point has particular salience in the insurance 
setting because of the extensiveness and specificity of insurance-related de-
fault rules, which have no parallel in ordinary contract law. 
 227. See RESTATEMENT OF LIAB. INS. (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 
1, 2016). 
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fault rules that are based on the presumed ex ante preferences 
of the parties. Insurers have no reason to go through the cost 
and uncertainty of changing their policy language to the extent 
that they are satisfied with default rules adopted by courts.228 
In the insurance context, redrafting costs include both regula-
tory compliance costs and the potential risk of inadvertently in-
troducing new ambiguities into a policy. Indeed, the case law is 
littered with instances in which courts have rebuffed insurers’ 
attempts to clarify policy language that was previously found to 
be ambiguous.229 
But even specific default rules that are intended, at least 
in part, to operate as penalty default rules, can undermine poli-
cy information. This is because specific penalty default rules 
provide a policy term with a fixed and predictable (albeit pro-
policyholder) meaning, which insurers can simply price into 
their coverage.230 To the extent that the resulting cost (in terms 
of moral hazard or adverse selection) is less than the costs of 
redrafting, insurers will simply opt for this alternative.231 
B. THE SOPHISTICATED POLICYHOLDER EXCEPTION TO CONTRA 
PROFERENTEM 
Courts across the country have struggled with whether and 
how the central rule of insurance law—contra proferentem—
applies to coverage disputes involving sophisticated policyhold-
ers. The majority of courts have concluded that contra 
proferentem is not limited to unsophisticated policyholders, so 
long as the policyholder did not directly draft any portion of the 
policy.232 And one court has even claimed that it “can conceive of 
no compelling reason why even a sophisticated insured should 
not be entitled to a pro-coverage interpretation of a standard-
 
 228. See Boardman, supra note 62, at 1117–18. 
 229. See Gaunt v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 160 F.2d 599, 602–03 
(2d Cir. 1947) (noting the game of drafting and redrafting). 
 230. See Boardman, supra note 62, at 1117–18. 
 231. See supra Part I. 
 232. See, e.g., Farmers Auto. Ins. Ass’n v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 482 
F.3d 976, 978 (7th Cir. 2007); Minn. Sch. Bds. Ass’n Ins. Tr. v. Emp’rs Ins. of 
Wausau, 331 F.3d 579, 581 (8th Cir. 2003); Alstrin v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. 
Co., 179 F. Supp. 2d 376, 390 (D. Del. 2002) (“Generally speaking, however, 
Delaware and Illinois courts continue to strictly construe ambiguities within 
insurance contracts against the insurer and in favor of the insured in situa-
tions where the insurer drafted the language that is being interpreted regard-
less of whether the insured is a large sophisticated company.”); Boeing Co. v. 
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 784 P.2d 507, 514 (Wash. 1990). 
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ized ISO policy drafted by the insurance industry.”233 Moreover, 
a number of commentators have endorsed the uniform applica-
tion of contra proferentem to all types of policyholders,234 as has 
the current draft of the Restatement of Liability Insurance.235 
Nonetheless, a small handful of states either retain a “sophisti-
cated policyholder” exception to contra proferentem,236 or else 
have indicated that courts ought to apply a less strict version of 
contra proferentem when the policyholder is a sophisticated en-
tity.237 
This Article cannot resolve this perennial issue of insur-
ance law, which is too complex and multifaceted to be suscepti-
ble to reductionist logic. But framing this issue in terms of cov-
erage information suggests novel arguments in favor of limiting 
the applicability of contra proferentem for insurance policies 
that are sold predominantly or exclusively to sophisticated poli-
cyholders.238 Under such an approach, courts would resolve the 
meaning of ambiguous policy language by developing specific, 
majoritarian default rules. For instance, a court facing a dis-
pute about whether or not pollution was “sudden and acci-
 
 233. New Castle Cty. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 933 F.2d 1162, 
1189 (3d Cir. 1991), abrogated by N. Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Aardvark Assocs., Inc., 
942 F.2d 189 (3d Cir. 1991). 
 234. See Hazel Glenn Beh, Reassessing the Sophisticated Insured Excep-
tion, 39 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 85 (2003); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Reas-
sessing the “Sophisticated” Policyholder Defense in Insurance Coverage Litiga-
tion, 42 DRAKE L. REV. 807 (1993). 
 235. See RESTATEMENT OF LIAB. INS. § 4 (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft 
No. 1, 2016) (rejecting a sophisticated policyholder defense). 
 236. Certain Underwriters at Lloyds London v. Perraud, 623 F. App’x 628, 
632 (5th Cir. 2015) (noting that Texas case law still hasn’t made a final black-
and-white ruling on whether it would accept a sophisticated insured exception 
to contra proferentum); W. Sling & Cable Co. v. Hamilton, 545 So. 2d 29 (Ala. 
1989); Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. John J. Bordlee Contractors, 543 F. Supp. 597, 602 
(E.D. La. 1982) (“[The ambiguity] rule is apt when the insured is an innocent 
and naive party unfamiliar with the insurance field. But where the insured is 
a corporation, as here, represented by counsel on the same professional level 
as the counsel for insurers, then ambiguous provisions . . . should be construed 
in favor of what reason and probability dictate was intended by the parties 
with respect to coverage.”). 
 237. Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Walbrook Ins. Co., 7 F.3d 1047, 1053 
(1st Cir. 1993). 
 238. The arguments developed in this Section would have particular force 
to the extent that an insurance policy issued to a sophisticated policyholder 
specifically attempted to disclaim the contra proferentem rule. In this case, 
the issue would not be whether contra proferentem is a good default rule, but 
instead whether it is a default rule or a mandatory rule. On this issue, see 
Baker & Logue, supra note 19. 
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dental,” as required for liability coverage under older versions 
of CGL policies, would eschew any argument that coverage 
should exist because the term is ambiguous as applied to the 
policyholder’s particular loss. Instead, the court would attempt 
to develop a workable principle to distinguish between covered 
and uncovered pollution, and would root that principle in the 
adverse selection and correlated risk concerns that motivated 
the exclusion in the first place.239 
As suggested in Section A, this approach would increase 
judicial information while decreasing policy information for in-
surance markets characterized predominantly by sophisticated 
purchasers. Utilizing specific, majoritarian default rules rather 
than contra proferentem would decrease policy information by 
refusing to penalize insurers for drafting unclear or incomplete 
policy language. At the same time, it would increase judicial in-
formation by developing specific and predictable default rules 
that could be imbued with meaning over time. Using a majori-
tarian approach to develop these specific default rules would 
increase their predictability to both insurers and policyholders, 
without any need for the insurer to incorporate these judicially 
developed rules and clarifications into the insurance policy it-
self. In the example above, the term “sudden and accidental” 
would thus start to take on a developed meaning that was not 
apparent in the insurance policy itself, but could be understood 
through the relevant case law. 
Once the sophisticated policyholder exception to contra 
proferentem is framed in terms of a tension between policy in-
formation and judicial information, the case for such an excep-
tion becomes both clearer and stronger, albeit still complicated. 
This is because there are good reasons to believe that judicial 
information is more important than policy information for in-
surance policies geared principally towards sophisticated poli-
cyholders. First, a core benefit of policy information—its capaci-
ty to deter unfair claims handling—is much less important for 
sophisticated policyholders than unsophisticated policyholders. 
Sophisticated policyholders are likely to routinely question an 
 
 239. Another example of this approach is the rule for allocation of long-tail 
harms in successive policies adopted by the Restatement. See RESTATEMENT 
OF LIAB. INS. § 44 (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 1, 2016). Rather than 
embracing a mechanical rule of contra proferentem that would always maxim-
ize the policyholders’ recovery, this section adopts a “pro rata by years” ap-
proach to allocation on the basis that this is what the parties would presump-
tively prefer from an ex ante perspective. See id. at cmt. c. 
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insurer’s denial of a claim or delay in payment and to have es-
tablished relationships with lawyers or sophisticated brokers 
capable of assisting in these efforts. Those sophisticated policy-
holders that believe they have been treated unfairly in the 
claims handling process generally have credible options for ex-
acting reputational penalties from the insurer. For instance, 
they can leverage their use of connected insurance brokers, who 
work primarily for them, to implicitly threaten insurers with 
reputational penalties.240 Perhaps even more importantly, they 
also have credible legal options for challenging an insurer’s 
coverage decision: unlike unsophisticated policyholders—who 
often have limited access to lawyers and a high discount rate 
that leads them to settle too quickly241—sophisticated policy-
holders have access to legal services as well as funding markets 
or capital to finance meritorious coverage litigation. 
Not only is the underlying risk of unfair claims handling 
reduced when policyholders are sophisticated, but so too is the 
prospect that policy information can substantially limit this 
risk. Policy information serves this function for ordinary poli-
cyholders because it makes available clear language regarding 
how coverage disputes should be resolved at the time of a 
claims decision, without the need for legal research. But so-
phisticated policyholders—with the help of brokers, lawyers, 
and other risk management professionals—can determine in-
surers’ coverage obligations even when those obligations are 
not clearly spelled out in the underlying contract. 
Policy information is less important for policies sold pre-
dominantly to sophisticated policyholders for a second reason: 
there is little or no need for regulatory form review in this con-
text. Indeed, many state regulators do not even review policy 
forms that are sold predominantly to sophisticated commercial 
actors, as many states exempt insurance policies from review if 
they are intended for policyholders who have a risk manager or 
whose premiums, net worth, or workforce exceeds specific 
thresholds.242 And even when states do conduct this review, it is 
 
 240. Neil A. Doherty & Alexander Muermann, Insuring the Uninsurable: 
Brokers and Incomplete Insurance Contracts 5 (Ctr. for Fin. Studies Working 
Paper No. 2005/24, 2005), https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/25461/1/ 
515325678.pdf. 
 241. See Alan O. Sykes, “Bad Faith” Refusal To Settle by Liability Insurers: 
Some Implications of the Judgment-Proof Problem, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 77, 84 
(1994). 
 242. See The Partial Deregulation of Commercial Property and Casualty 
Insurance: Benefits and Challenges, CPCU SOC’Y REG. & LEGIS. INT. GRP. 
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not generally important for ensuring the efficient operation of 
markets, as commercial actors can and do rely on sophisticated 
brokers to monitor policy forms and make coverage recommen-
dations accordingly.243 The insurance brokers that provide this 
service are themselves highly sophisticated repeat players 
who—unlike most of the insurance intermediaries selling cov-
erage to ordinary individuals—owe fiduciary obligations of loy-
alty and care to their clients.244 Sophisticated brokers’ under-
standing of competing coverage forms generally extends well 
beyond the language contained in individual policies. Indeed, 
sophisticated brokers routinely keep up with court decisions on 
the policies they sell through industry publications and firm-
generated research.245 
While policy information is therefore comparatively less 
important for policies sold predominantly to sophisticated poli-
cyholders, judicial information is of paramount importance in 
this context. Sophisticated policyholders are much more likely 
than ordinary policyholders to consistently contest claims when 
the relevant judicial information is underdeveloped. This is for 
many of the reasons explored above: these policyholders have 
access to sophisticated attorneys and the willingness to expend 
funds on lawsuits that may take a substantial time to resolve. 
All this means that the lack of robust judicial information in 
markets populated by sophisticated policyholders creates a 
substantial possibility of extensive litigation costs and uncer-
tainty regarding how different types of claims should be re-
solved. To illustrate, recall the example of court cases finding 
that CGL policies cover certain forms of cyber liability. Sophis-
ticated policyholders who are advised by well-informed lawyers 
are much more likely than less sophisticated policyholders to 
seek to extend these holdings to new jurisdictions and new 
cyber liability losses. 
Not only does this increased litigation risk from limited ju-
dicial information increase the costs to policyholders, insurers, 
 
COMPLIANCE MATTERS, June 2013, at 3. 
 243. For a general overview of form regulation, see ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, 
supra note 2, at 142–45. 
 244. See Schwarcz & Siegelman, supra note 32. 
 245. See, e.g., BUS. INS., http://www.businessinsurance.com (last visited 
Mar. 12, 2017); NAT’L UNDERWRITER LIFE & HEALTH MAG., http://www 
.lifehealthpro.com/National-Underwriter-Life-Health (last visited Mar. 12, 
2017). Sophisticated brokers may subscribe to these services, which routinely 
cover relevant court cases, market trends, and practice tips to assist them in 
their practice. 
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and courts of resolving disputes, but it also exposes insurers to 
the prospect of highly correlated losses. Recall that limited ju-
dicial information increases the risk that any particular case 
will substantially increase the scope of coverage provided by a 
policy. This risk is substantially elevated for sophisticated poli-
cyholders, for two reasons. First, they are more likely to seek to 
systematically exploit any shift in judicial information. Second, 
they are more likely to be covered by long-tail insurance poli-
cies, which are common in many policies that are sold to so-
phisticated policyholders, such as CGL policies. 
Once again, none of this is to suggest that there are not 
plausible objections to a sophisticated policyholder exception to 
contra proferentem. Perhaps the most compelling such objec-
tion is that many types of policies—such as CGL policies—are 
sold both to highly sophisticated policyholders and less sophis-
ticated policyholders.246 Enhanced policy information could thus 
benefit unsophisticated policyholders even when the policy-
holder suing for coverage is sophisticated.247 Additionally, poli-
cyholders cannot be easily and accurately segregated into “so-
phisticated” and “unsophisticated” groupings. Although it is 
possible to adopt a rules-based approach to this issue,248 any 
such approach would, of course, be both over- and under-
inclusive. Ultimately, however, the core point here is that ap-
preciating the nature and value of policy and judicial infor-
mation helps provide a new perspective on an important issue 
in insurance law, even if it cannot unambiguously resolve the 
issue. 
 
 246. See, e.g., Boeing Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 784 P.2d 507, 514 
(Wash. 1990) (“[S]tandard form polic[ies] ha[ve] been issued to big and small 
[insureds] throughout the state. Therefore it would be incongruous for the 
court to apply different rules of construction.”). 
 247. Cruz & Hinck, supra note 95, at 670. One judicial challenge from a so-
phisticated policyholder may be all that is necessary to dictate the inclusion of 
certain terms in a standard form contract. If judicial information becomes 
available through that challenge, unsophisticated policyholders using the 
same standard form policy will benefit as well. Id. 
 248. One promising approach—originally suggested for another purpose in 
early drafts of the Principles of Liability Insurance project, before it was con-
verted to a “restatement” project—would be to use a net asset threshold of $10 
million, matching the threshold used in federal securities regulation, to distin-
guish between sophisticated and unsophisticated policyholders. See PRINCI-
PLES OF THE LAW OF LIAB. INS. § 1(4) (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 1, 
2013). 
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*** 
Although the focus here has been on the sophisticated poli-
cyholder exception to the ambiguity rule, there are numerous 
other doctrinal disputes that can be helpfully framed and ana-
lyzed in terms of the conflict between judicial information and 
policy information. For instance, some courts effectively use 
policyholders’ reasonable expectations of coverage to constrain 
application of the ambiguity rule, reasoning that policyholders 
should not receive more coverage than they could reasonably 
expect even if the relevant policy language is, in fact, unclear. 
Whether this approach makes sense, or courts should instead 
use the ambiguity rule to penalize sloppy drafting, turns in 
part on the relative value of judicial information and policy in-
formation. 
  CONCLUSION   
A central goal of insurance law is to clarify, produce, and 
disseminate information about the scope of insurers’ coverage 
obligations to policyholders. Doctrines such as the reasonable 
expectations rule and estoppel, along with regulations govern-
ing insurer marketing and disclosure, aim to ensure that gen-
erally accurate coverage information is communicated to poli-
cyholders during the process of purchasing coverage (purchaser 
information). Meanwhile, the ambiguity rule, in concert with a 
bevy of insurance readability regulations, is concerned princi-
pally with promoting clear and more specific coverage infor-
mation within the four corners of the insurance policy itself 
(policy information). Finally, insurance law produces a wealth 
of coverage information within judicial opinions, most clearly 
by specifying various default rules and definitions/tests that 
courts apply to vague or incomplete insurance policy terms (ju-
dicial information). Each of these three forms of coverage in-
formation serves a number of distinctive and potentially im-
portant roles in promoting the efficient operation of insurance 
markets. Appreciating these potential benefits sheds new light 
on a variety of perennial issues in insurance law, ranging from 
the sophisticated policyholder exception to the ambiguity rule, 
to the admissibility of extrinsic evidence to disambiguate policy 
language, to the optimal design of insurance disclosure and 
readability rules. 
